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Litigating Secrets
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE STATE
SECRETS PRIVILEGE
Sudha Setty †
INTRODUCTION
The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary
privilege, which enables the government to prevent disclosure
of sensitive state secrets in the course of litigation. The claim of
privilege by the government, if upheld by a court, can result in
consequences ranging from the denial of a discovery request for
a particular document to the outright dismissal of a suit. Some
describe the state secrets privilege as the “most powerful
secrecy privilege available to the president” and the executive
branch.1 Its scope is coextensive with any kind of information
classified as “secret” or a higher level of secrecy,2 and applies to
both criminal and civil lawsuits.
The privilege has been invoked by every administration
since the Supreme Court acknowledged its existence in the
1953 case of United States v. Reynolds,3 which was based in
large part on English precedent. The privilege has never been
†
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1
Press Release, Office of U.S. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Kennedy
Introduces State Secrets Protection Act (Jan. 22, 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted), available at http://kennedy.senate.gov/newsroom/press_release.cfm?id=
C56BD1D0-7AD3-46EA-9D30-A77317F28B70; see also William G. Weaver & Danielle
Escontrias, Origins of the State Secrets Privilege 3-4 (Feb. 10, 2008) (unpublished
paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1079364).
2
Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 1, at 7.
3
345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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clarified by statute; Congress undertook reform efforts in 2008
out of concerns that the Bush administration overreached in its
claims of privilege by seeking more dismissals during the
pleadings stage, and that courts have not used a uniform
standard to assess those claims.4
Congress reintroduced reform legislation in February
20095 after the Obama administration appeared to adopt the
Bush administration’s stance in favor of a broad and sweeping
invocation and application of the state secrets privilege.6 The
proposed legislation is pending even as the Obama
administration released a new policy for the Department of
Justice, mandating a more rigorous internal review prior to
invoking the state secrets privilege.7
As with many other initiatives related to the
prosecution of the war on terror, the question of the
appropriate application of the privilege turns on the balance
between national security and the need to preserve the rule of
law, individual rights, liberty interests, and government
accountability. Congress’s reform efforts continue to be
necessary to restore the long-term appropriate balance among
these competing interests.
This Article considers the modern application of the
privilege in Scotland, England, Israel, and India—an analysis
that contextualizes both the current use of the U.S. privilege
and the efforts at legislative reform. Such comparative analysis
is necessary to fully understand the transnational implications
of the U.S. application of the state secrets privilege that have
recently come to light in litigation involving both the United
States and England.
This Article considers the reform efforts in the context
of the experience of other nations. This Article concludes that
4

154 CONG. REC. S198-201 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2008) (statement by Sen.
Kennedy on the State Secrets Protection Act).
5
See Press Release, Office of U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Specter,
Feingold, Kennedy Introduce State Secrets Legislation (Feb. 11, 2009), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200902/021109b.html.
6
Editorial, Continuity of the Wrong Kind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, at A30
(disagreeing with the Obama administration’s decision to continue the Bush
administration invocations of the state secrets privilege to try to have litigation against
the government dismissed at the pleadings stage).
7
See Memorandum from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Heads of
Executive Departments & Agencies (Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Holder
Memorandum],
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/state-secretprivilieges.pdf (establishing layers of internal review within the Department of Justice
and including a new executive branch policy to report to Congress any invocations of
the state secrets privilege).
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the current application of the privilege follows English
precedent and modern English practices, although English
courts have recently expressed concern at the broad application
of the privilege by the U.S. government. Indian practices are
more restrictive on information disclosure than the current or
proposed practices in the United States. Other countries that
take precedent from the British system—including Scotland
and Israel—mandate a more limited application of the state
secrets privilege and conform generally to the standards
contained in the proposed legislation. Finally, this Article finds
that Israel, unlike the United States, further explicitly
accounts for allegations of government human rights abuses in
determining whether a case involving national security matters
ought to be heard by the courts.
Part I of this Article details the efforts to reform the
state secrets privilege and addresses the motivation behind
these proposed reforms in the United States, namely the desire
to curb perceived executive branch overreaching, to create a
uniform and workable judicial standard, and to reassert the
rule of law in the adjudication of national security litigation.
This Part discusses some of the most prominent cases in which
the state secrets privilege has been invoked, where allegations
of gross violations of human and civil rights have been quashed
by invocation of the privilege. This Part considers and
ultimately rejects concerns that congressional reform efforts
impermissibly
impinge
on
constitutionally
reserved
presidential powers,8 and also rejects concerns that a more
restrictive privilege may lead to the unnecessary dissemination
of sensitive information and may infringe on the constitutional
rights of the Executive branch.
Part II examines the history of the U.S. state secrets
privilege, including its origins in the United Kingdom, the
intended balancing test set forth in Reynolds, and the
subsequent expansion of the invocation of the privilege since
Reynolds. Although Reynolds sets forth a specific balancing test
for determining whether a claim of privilege should be applied,
that test has been abdicated in most instances. As currently
applied, almost any invocation of the state secrets privilege is

8

The U.S. Supreme Court described the state secrets privilege as “the
evidentiary state secrets privilege” in Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6, 8 (2005), making clear
that the privilege is not a constitutionally-based privilege, but rather one developed by
the courts, id. at 9.
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accepted at face value and without examination of the
documents over which the privilege is being claimed.
Part III examines from a comparative perspective how
the state secrets privilege has evolved in four other countries
drawing on the English legal tradition—Scotland, England,
Israel, and India. These countries offer a spectrum of responses
as to the appropriate application of a state secrets privilege and
each strikes a different balance among the interests of national
security, liberty, and the rule of law.
Finally, Part IV considers how the U.S. treatment of the
state secrets privilege fits into the comparative context. Here, I
conclude that in the interest of creating a better balance
between the rule of law and national security concerns, the
United States should not only consider reforming and
clarifying the privilege, but also should consider adding an
additional element advising courts to consider the human
rights interests that may be at stake in a particular lawsuit.
I.

WHY REFORM THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE?

In January 2008, a bipartisan group of senators
introduced the State Secrets Protection Act,9 calling for the
passage of a “safe, fair, and responsible state secrets privilege
Act.”10 In March 2008, members of the House of
Representatives introduced their own State Secret Protection
Act of 2008,11 seeking to establish “safe, fair, and responsible
procedures and standards for resolving claims of state secret
privilege.”12 Representative Jerrold Nadler, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties, described the need to reform the
privilege as follows:
If you have an Administration that is abusing civil liberties . . .
improperly arrests someone . . . improperly tortures that person . . .
one presumes that that Administration will not prosecute itself
[or] . . . its own agents for those terrible acts.

9

State Secrets Protection Act of 1998, S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008);
see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15-27, El-Masri v. United States, 128 S. Ct.
373 (2007) (No. 06-1613) (noting the importance of clarifying the application of the
state secrets privilege).
10
154 CONG. REC. S93 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2008) (introduction by Sen. Ted Kennedy).
11
State Secrets Protection Act of 2008, H.R. 5607, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008).
12
Id.
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The normal remedy in American law—the only remedy I know
of—is for that person, once recovered from the torture, to sue for
various kinds of damages and in court elucidate the facts . . . and get
some justice and perhaps bring out to light what happened so that
that Administration would not do it again or the next one wouldn’t.
If, however, that lawsuit can be dismissed right at the pleadings
stage by the assertion of state secrets, and if the court doesn’t look
behind the assertion . . . and simply takes it at face value . . . the
government says state secrets would be revealed and it would harm
the national security if this case went forward, therefore case
dismissed, which seems to be the current state of the law—if that
continues and we don’t change that, what remedy is there ever to
enforce any of our constitutional rights?13

Although the impetus for legislative reform appeared to
weaken with the election of President Obama,14 recent
invocations of the privilege by the Obama administration and
pressure applied by the Obama administration to foreign
governments making their own state secrets determinations
prompted Congress to reintroduce similar legislation in
February 2009.15
By re-assessing the privilege, Congress is taking an
important first step toward providing additional rule-of-law
protections
against
executive
branch
overreaching,
maintaining the judicial role in executive oversight, and
strengthening the protections for individual litigants bringing
suit against the government.16 In doing so, Congress
appropriately took into account the changing national security
landscape in the years since the recognition by the Supreme
Court of the U.S. privilege in United States v. Reynolds.17

13

State Secrets Protection Act of 2008: Hearing on H.R. 5607 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 77 (2008) (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary).
14
Mark Mazzetti & William Glaberson, Obama Issues Directive to Shut
Down Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009 (quoting Obama administration
representatives as highlighting the importance of “protecting our national security,
respecting the Geneva Conventions and the rule of law, and respecting the existing
institutions of justice in this country”).
15
See Press Release, Office of U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy, supra note 5
(reintroducing state secrets reform legislation and setting forth concerns regarding
executive branch use of the privilege).
16
William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive
Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 90 (2005) (arguing that the courts should clarify the
privilege to enhance these protections against executive branch overreaching).
17
345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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United States v. Reynolds: The Domestic Standard is
Established

The formal acknowledgement of the state secrets
privilege in the United States is, perhaps surprisingly, rather
recent. The 1953 case of United States v. Reynolds18 stands as
the seminal case in which the U.S. approach to invocations of
the state secrets privilege was established.19
In Reynolds, the family members of three civilians killed
in the crash of a military plane sought compensation from the
government for wrongful death. The government asserted the
state secrets privilege in response to a document request by
plaintiffs for the flight accident report.20 The trial court directed
the government to produce the report to the court for a
determination of privilege.21 When the government refused, the
judge made an adverse inference and ordered a $250,000
judgment for the plaintiffs.22 The Third Circuit affirmed the
decision, noting that a court should diligently refuse to accept
blindly all claims of privilege; instead, a court should conduct
an ex parte examination of the evidence to make an
individualized privilege determination.23
The Supreme Court reversed, although it agreed with
part of the Third Circuit’s reasoning in noting that the greater
the necessity for the allegedly privileged information in
presenting the case, the greater the need for the court to “probe
in satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege is
appropriate.”24 The Court further reasoned that “[j]udicial
control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the
caprice of executive officers.”25 However, the Court
acknowledged the strength of the evidentiary privilege of the

18

345 U.S. 1 (1953).
For an in-depth account of the Reynolds case, see LOUIS FISHER, IN THE
NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS
CASE (2006).
20
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 3-4. The government also cited to Air Force
Regulation No. 62-7(5)(b), which precluded disclosure of such reports outside the
authorized chain of command without the approval of the Secretary of the Air Force.
Id. at 3-4 n.4.
21
Id. at 5.
22
Id.
23
Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 996-97 (3d Cir. 1953), rev’d, 345
U.S. 1 (1953).
24
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
25
Id. at 9-10.
19
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executive,26 and noted in passing that some commentators
believed the privilege to be constitutionally grounded as well.27
The Court ultimately upheld the right of the
government to refuse to provide evidence and laid out a more
deferential analytical framework by which future courts should
evaluate a claim of privilege: (1) the claim must be asserted by
the head of the department which has the responsibility for the
information and evidence in question;28 (2) the court has the
responsibility to determine whether the disclosure in question
would pose a “reasonable danger . . . [to] national security”;29 (3)
the court should take into account the plaintiff’s need for
information to litigate its case;30 (4) the court should, if
necessary, undertake an ex parte, in camera review of the
information at issue to determine whether a reasonable danger
exists;31 and (5) if the court determines that the “reasonable
danger” standard is met, the privilege is absolute—it cannot be
overcome by the plaintiff’s showing of a need for the
information,32 whether the case involves issues of human rights
or any other countervailing considerations.
Given the ease with which the government could satisfy
the low “reasonable danger” standard, the Reynolds court
decided that the trial court did not need to examine the flight
accident report over which the government was claiming the
privilege, noting that “this is a time of vigorous preparation for
national defense.”33 If it had ordered disclosure for the court’s
review, it may have discovered what was revealed only when
the report was de-classified in the 1990s: there were no
military secrets in the report, as claimed by the government,
but there was evidence that the plane lacked standard
safeguards that might have prevented its crash—the very
26

Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 6 n.9. The idea that the state secrets privilege is rooted in the
President’s inherent constitutional authority was rejected in Tenet v. Doe, which made
clear that the state secrets privilege is an evidentiary privilege, meaning Congress can
be involved in setting parameters on the invocation and use of the privilege. 544 U.S. 1,
9 (2005).
28
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8.
29
Id. at 10.
30
Id. at 11.
31
See, e.g., Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190,1204 (9th
Cir. 2007) (pointing out that the district court had the option of holding an ex parte, in
camera review of the government’s wiretapping records in accordance with the strict
procedures of FISA, but that it chose not do so).
32
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
33
Id. at 10-11 (concluding that, given the “circumstances of the case,” no need
to review the accident report existed because of an “available alternative”).
27
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negligence on which the family members in Reynolds based
their lawsuit.34 The decision by the Reynolds Court to decline to
at least ascertain whether the document in question contained
the information claimed to be privileged was a fundamental
and determinative flaw—one that has been replicated by many
courts in the intervening years.35
Reynolds is the only instance in which the Supreme
Court has articulated a standard for the state secrets privilege;
given the dearth of U.S. precedent,36 the Court based its
reasoning on numerous other sources, including the English
case of Duncan v. Cammel, Laird, & Co.37 decided in 1942.38
Cammel, Laird’s acknowledgement of a robust evidentiary
privilege available to the executive was not, however, the only
basis on which the Reynolds court made its decision; the Court
also considered other sources, such as earlier U.S. cases
involving various privileges39 and Wigmore’s treatise on
evidence.40 Wigmore noted the need for a state secrets privilege,
but cautioned—even then, in 1940—that the privilege “has
been so often improperly invoked and so loosely misapplied
that a strict definition of its legitimate limits must be made,”41
and that courts, not the executive branch itself, were the
appropriate decision-makers regarding the privilege.42
34

Patrick Radden Keefe, State Secrets—A Government Misstep in a
Wiretapping Case, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 28, 2008, at 28; cf. Herring v. United States,
424 F.3d 384, 392 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the United States did not commit a fraud
on the court in its representations during the Reynolds litigation).
35
See Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 16, at 101 (noting that courts have
looked at the underlying documents in less than one-third of cases in which the state
secrets privilege was asserted).
36
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.
37
Id. Prior to the Supreme Court decision, the Third Circuit distinguished
the Reynolds case from the privilege decision in Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co.,
[1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.), based on the differences in the nature of judicial roles in
England and the United States. See Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d
Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
38
See Nicole Hallett, Protecting National Security or Covering Up
Malfeasance: The Modern State Secrets Privilege and its Alternatives, 117 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 82, 83 (2007), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/589.pdf.
39
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7 n.11.
40
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2212a(4)
(3d ed. 1940); see also Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6-7.
41
WIGMORE, supra note 38, § 2212a.
42
Wigmore further commented,
Shall every subordinate in the department have access to the secret, and not
the presiding officer of justice? Cannot the constitutionally coordinate body of
government share the confidence? The truth cannot be escaped that a Court
which abdicates its inherent function of determining the facts upon which the
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In Reynolds, the Supreme Court established a
standardized doctrine by which to evaluate claims of a state
secrets privilege; this doctrine balanced national security
matters with adherence to the rule of law and attention to
rights of individual litigants.43 However, the balancing test set
forth in Reynolds has often been subsumed by a judicial
tendency to uphold claims of privilege without engaging in a
meaningful analysis of the underlying evidence or the
government’s claimed need for nondisclosure.44 In recent years,
that tendency has come under scrutiny as the current war on
terror has led to numerous lawsuits in which national security
programs have been implicated.
B.

Impetus for Reform

Congress took up the question of the privilege in 2008
for several reasons. First, the “war on terror” has led to highly
controversial actions such as the National Security Agency’s
warrantless wiretapping program as well as the extraordinary
rendition of individuals by the Central Intelligence Agency.45
Second, the unprecedented level of secrecy46 within the George
admissibility of evidence depends will furnish to bureaucratic officials too
ample opportunities for abusing the privilege.
Id. § 2379.
43

See also Ilann Margalit Maazel, The State Secrets Privilege, N.Y.L.J., July
24, 2008, at 3 (noting that the Reynolds doctrine was initially “narrow and sensible”).
44
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 16. This judicial tendency is analyzed in
further detail in infra Part II.
45
Although the Obama administration has already begun to modify the
executive branch’s stance on many of the issues surrounding the war on terror and the
prosecution of alleged terrorists and enemy combatants, it is unclear how
administration intelligence programs will ultimately be structured. See Adam Liptak,
Early Test of Obama View on Power Over Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2009, at A1;
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Great Limits Come with Great Power, Ex-Candidate Finds, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 25, 2009, at A22 (detailing the hurdles to fulfilling President Obama’s
campaign promises regarding, among other areas, reform of national security policies).
46
See, e.g., Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How Transparency of
Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists Win, 57 KAN. L. REV. 579, 59698 (2009). One significant shift in information disclosure is the difference in treatment
of requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) between the Clinton
administration and the Bush administration. Compare Memorandum from John
Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., on the Freedom of Information Act to the Heads of all Federal
Departments
and
Agencies
(Oct.
12,
2001),
available
at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB84/Ashcroft%20Memorandum.pdf
(“When you carefully consider FOIA requests and decide to withhold records, in whole
or in part, you can be assured that the Department of Justice will defend your decisions
unless they lack a sound legal basis . . . .”), with Memorandum from Janet Reno, Att’y
Gen., on the Freedom of Information Act to the Heads of Departments and Agencies
(Oct. 4, 1993), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia_updates/Vol_XIV_3/page3.htm
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W. Bush administration led to suspicions that the government
was not necessarily acting in good faith in invoking the
privilege,47 and that such trends would persist in future
administrations.48 Further, a “mosaic theory”49 of terrorist
(“The Department [of Justice] will no longer defend an agency’s withholding of
information merely because there is a ‘substantial legal basis’ for doing so. Rather, in
determining whether or not to defend nondisclosure decisions, we will apply a
presumption of disclosure.”). Congress’s attempts to strengthen FOIA in December
2007 were undermined by the Bush administration’s efforts to have disputes mediated
by the Department of Justice, as opposed to the less partisan National Archives. See
Editorial, The Cult of Secrecy at the White House, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at A30.
47
State Secrets Protection Act of 2008: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 78 (2d Sess. 2008) (statement of Steven Shapiro, legal director of the A.C.L.U.)
(noting the need for reform of the privilege, since “courts need to look at the invocation
of the state secrets privilege skeptically and make sure it is really being raised to
protect national security and not to shield government officials from legal and political
accountability”). In the government’s brief in the case of New York Times Co. v. United
States, then-Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold wrote:
[I]n the present case high government officials have explained the reasons for
their concern; that judgment is enough to support the Executive Branch’s
conclusion, reflected in the top secret classification of the documents and in
the in camera evidence, that disclosure would pose the threat of serious
injury to the national security.
Brief for the United States at 18, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (No. 1873). Decades later, Griswold conceded, “I have never seen any trace of a
threat to the national security from the publication [of the Pentagon Papers]. Indeed, I
have never seen it even suggested that there was such a threat.” Erwin N. Griswold,
Editorial, Secrets Not Worth Keeping; The Courts and Classified Information, WASH.
POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25.
48
In September 2009 the Obama administration released a new set of
guidelines governing invocation of the state secrets privilege by the administration. See
Holder Memorandum, supra note 7. Although initial reaction from the public and
Congress has been positive, many believe that a congressional check is still necessary
to counteract the potential for abuse within the executive branch. See Charlie Savage,
Justice Dept. to Limit Use of State Secrets Privilege, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2009 at A16
(“Congress must still enact legislation that provides consistent standards and
procedures for courts to use when considering state secrets claims. Our constitutional
system requires meaningful, independent judicial review of governmental secrecy
claims.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Representative Jerrold Nadler)).
As of this writing, there is no information as to how the new policy has affected
executive branch decision-making regarding the invocation of the state secrets
privilege.
49
The court in Halkin v. Helms explained the “mosaic theory” of national
security as follows:
It requires little reflection to understand that the business of foreign
intelligence gathering in this age of computer technology is more akin to the
construction of a mosaic than it is to the management of a cloak and dagger
affair. Thousands of bits and pieces of seemingly innocuous information can
be analyzed and fitted into place to reveal with startling clarity how the
unseen whole must operate.
598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See, e.g., Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 405 F. Supp.
2d 23, 33 (D.D.C. 2005) (reasoning that the mosaic theory justified the government
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activity would create a broad protection over large swaths of
relevant information that may not, at least regarding
individual documents, satisfy the Reynolds standard.50 Third,
many critics see the state secrets privilege as a broad and
expansive means for executive branch overreaching in which
the bad actions of the administration are withheld from private
litigants and the judicial system, and concealed from Congress
and the public.51
The administration’s warrantless wiretapping program
was challenged numerous times in court, but the government’s
frequent invocation of the state secrets privilege meant that
plaintiffs met with little success in pursuing lawsuits against
the government regarding the program. Specifically, the
government has invoked the state secrets privilege on several
occasions52 to protect records that would have allowed the
plaintiffs to prove that they were subject to wiretapping and
thus had standing to challenge the program.53
An emblematic case is that of the al-Haramain Islamic
Foundation, an Islamic charity based in Saudi Arabia and
operating worldwide, including in the United States, which
filed suit against the U.S. government for being subject to
allegedly unconstitutional warrantless wiretapping of
telephone conversations by the National Security Agency
decision to not disclose information requested under FOIA); see also David E. Pozen,
The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE
L.J. 628, 633-41 (2005) (outlining the history of the mosaic theory as it pertains to
FOIA litigation).
50
E.g., Ctr. for Nat’l Sec’y Studies. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 933
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding FOIA’s law enforcement exemption with regard to a mosaic
theory of terrorism); see also ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 564-66
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (upholding, in part, the government’s use of the Glomar Doctrine—
neither confirming nor denying the alleged government activity—to exempt it from
FOIA disclosure requirements).
51
See Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security
Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1252, 1269 (2007) (arguing that such practices
extend beyond any particular administration).
52
E.g., ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758-66 (E.D. Mich. 2006), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 493 F.3d 644, 662-64 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 1334 (2008); see also Recent Cases, Federal Courts—Standing—Sixth Circuit
Denies Standing to Challenge Terrorist Surveillance Program—ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d
644 (6th Cir. 2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 922, 922 (2008) (arguing that standing rules
should be relaxed under such circumstances).
53
E.g., Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir.
2007) (“Al-Haramain cannot establish that it suffered injury in fact, a ‘concrete and
particularized’ injury, because the Sealed Document, which Al-Haramain alleges
proves that its members were unlawfully surveilled, is protected by the state secrets
privilege.”); ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 765 (state secrets privilege prevented
plaintiffs from establishing data-mining claim); Hepting v. AT&T, 439 F. Supp. 2d.
974, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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(NSA).54 Al-Haramain was in the unique position of being able
to offer documented proof that it was subject to NSA
wiretapping, since the government had accidentally turned
over transcripts and records of the wiretapping activity to an
Al-Haramain lawyer.55 The Bush administration sought to
recover most copies of the report in the possession of AlHaramain’s counsel and others, but did not try to recover those
copies that had been sent outside of the United States.56
The government moved to dismiss Al-Haramain’s case
based on the state secrets privilege; the motion was denied,
although the presiding judge agreed to exclude the wiretapping
report from the evidence available to plaintiffs.57 The Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded the case from an interlocutory
appeal, holding that because the privilege surrounding the
wiretapping records was “absolute,” the district court’s decision
to use affidavits was unacceptable.58 Because the district court
should not have considered the document in any respect, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that plaintiffs could not establish an
injury in fact, and, therefore, lacked standing.59 On remand, the
district court was tasked to determine whether Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) preempts the state
secrets privilege such that the lawsuit could survive.60 The
court concluded that FISA trumped the state secrets privilege,61
noting that “[t]he enactment of FISA was the fruition of a
period of intense public and Congressional interest in the

54

Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1193, 1195. Specifically, al-Haramain alleged
violations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-71
(2007), which governed government surveillance of telecommunications activity, and
the Fourth Amendment. See Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1193, 1195; see also Carol D.
Leonnig & Mary Beth Sheridan, Saudi Group Alleges Wiretapping by U.S., WASH.
POST, Mar. 2, 2006, at A1.
55
See Leonnig & Sheridan, supra note 54.
56
See Keefe, supra note 34, at 28, 31 (describing how the government did not
act to recover copies that were sent to Al-Haramain personnel in Saudi Arabia).
57
Id. at 31-32. The judge instead ordered that the plaintiffs create affidavits
based on their recollections of the privileged document. See Al-Haramain Islamic
Found. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1229 (D. Or. 2006), rev’d and remanded, 507
F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007).
58
Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1204. The Ninth Circuit pointed out that the
district court could have held an ex parte, in camera review of the wiretapping records
in accordance with the strict procedures of FISA, but that it did not do so. Id. at 1205.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 1206.
61
In re NSA Telecomm. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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problem of unchecked domestic surveillance by the executive
branch.”62
The court reasoned that section 1806(f) of FISA
governed how sensitive government information resulting from
surveillance ought to be handled by the courts, and that 1806(f)
trumped the Reynolds framework for analyzing state secrets
claims.63 The court went further still, holding that 1806(f) was
“in effect a codification of the state secrets privilege for
purposes of relevant cases under FISA, as modified to reflect
Congress’s precise directive to the federal courts for the
handling of materials and information with purported national
security implications. . . . [T]he Reynolds protocol has no role
where section 1806(f) applies.”64 The district court’s holding
kept the plaintiff’s claim alive, with Al-Haramain bearing the
burden of proving surveillance apart from the wiretapping
records that were inadvertently produced by the government.65
In April 2009, the district court indicated that the government
would not have carte blanche to assert the privilege by
instructing both parties to work together to draft a protective
order to delineate how classified and sensitive information will
be treated.66 The court also admonished Obama administration
lawyers for their continued attempts to garner a stay and delay
the disclosure of information relevant to plaintiff’s case.67
A second motivating factor68 for the current push of state
secrets reform is growing evidence of extreme cases of detainee
62

Id. at 1115. The court relied on the post-Watergate Church Committee
Report on the unconstitutional domestic surveillance activities of the Nixon
administration, see id., as well as the framework for assessing presidential actions
taken in defiance of congressional will set forth in Justice Jackson’s concurrence in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. See id. at 1116 (citing Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)).
63
Id. at 1119.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 1131.
66
Order at 2-3, In re NSA, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 061791 VRW). In doing so, the court also rejected a far-reaching argument by the Obama
administration that the court had no authority to order that counsel for al-Haramain
be granted access to classified information over the objection of the executive branch.
See Government Defendants’ Response to Court Orders Concerning Compliance with
the January 5 Order and Response to Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Case Management
Report at 7-10, In re NSA, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. M:06-CV-01791VRW).
67
Order at 1-2, In re NSA, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 061791 VRW).
68
Other recent cases have also implicated the state secrets privilege, but
were resolved on other grounds or did not garner as much attention as the El-Masri
case. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated and superseded, No. 064216-CV, 2009 WL 3522887 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc); see also William Fisher, State
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mistreatment that have shocked the public: emblematic is the
case of Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen who was subjected
to extraordinary rendition by the U.S. government69 in what
was later acknowledged as a case of mistaken identity.70
In December 2003, El-Masri was taking a holiday from
his hometown of Ulm, Germany, to Skopje, Macedonia. He was
taken into custody by Macedonian authorities while on a bus
crossing the border from Serbia.71 According to El-Masri, in
January 2004, he was transported to an airport where he was
beaten, stripped naked, photographed, and then sodomized.72
He was then subject to “extraordinary rendition” by the CIA,
who transported him to a prison in Kabul, Afghanistan.73
El-Masri was finally released on May 28, 2004,74 after
having been in captivity for approximately five months, during
which he was allegedly subject to numerous harsh
interrogations by the CIA, which included “threats, insults,
pushing, and shoving,”75 as well as force-feeding through a
nasal tube.76 Upon his release, El-Masri sought out German
officials, who launched an investigation regarding his
allegations of abduction, detention, and abuse.77
In 2005, El-Masri sued George Tenet, the former
director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the airlines
complicit in his rendition, and various other individuals.78 The
Secrets Privilege Derails Rendition Suit, ARAB AM. NEWS, July 11, 2008, at 8; Benjamin
Weiser, Appeals Court Hears Case of Canadian Citizen Sent by U.S. to Syria, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2009, at A39.
69
For a full account of Khaled El-Masri’s story of rendition, see JANE MAYER,
THE DARK SIDE 282-87 (2008).
70
See Glenn Kessler, Rice to Admit German’s Abduction Was an Error: On
European Trip, Rice Faces Scrutiny on Prisoner Policy, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2005, at
A18; Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake, WASH. POST,
Dec. 4, 2005, at A1.
71
Complaint at ¶ 23, El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006)
(No. 1:05cv1417), available at http://www.aclu.org/images/extraordinaryrendition/asset
_upload_file829_22211.pdf.
72
Id. ¶ 28.
73
Id. ¶¶ 29-35 (alleging that El-Masri was blindfolded, shackled, forced into
a diaper, and rendered unconscious by injections during his transport).
74
Id. ¶ 43.
75
Id. ¶ 40.
76
Id. ¶ 44.
77
Id. ¶ 57.
78
Id. ¶¶ 65-72 (alleging violations of due process); id. ¶¶ 73-82 (alleging
prolonged arbitrary detention); id. ¶¶ 83-92 (alleging torture and other degrading
treatment); see Reform of the State Secrets Privilege: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 3 (2d Sess. 2008) [hereinafter Privilege Hearings] (prepared statement of
H. Thomas Wells, Jr., President-Elect, ABA).
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government argued for dismissal of the suit based on the state
secrets privilege, claiming that national security interests
would be compromised if the litigation were to continue, and
that state secrets were central to El-Masri making his case
against the government.79 This privilege claim was made
despite the United States’ admission of the existence and
operation of a rendition program, as well as the support for ElMasri’s factual account by German investigators and
prosecutors.80 The federal district court agreed with the
government’s claim and dismissed El-Masri’s suit at the
motion-to-dismiss stage of the litigation, prior to the
government’s filing an answer to El-Masri’s complaint.81 The
federal appeals court sustained the dismissal,82 and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2007.83
In denying certiorari, the Supreme Court essentially
chose to let stand the lack of clarity surrounding the standard
for determining what procedures a court should use to evaluate
potentially privileged evidence, whether a court should dismiss
a suit in response to a valid privilege claim, and whether
dismissal can occur prior to evidentiary discovery or even the
filing of an answer to the complaint.84
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit decision in Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,85 deviates significantly from the
Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in El-Masri and articulates a
narrower standard for upholding an invocation of the state
secrets privilege. In Mohamed, the district court dismissed a
suit brought by five detainees against a Boeing subsidiary
allegedly involved in the transportation of the detainees for
government-directed rendition and torture.86 The district court
cited many of the same reasons that the courts in El-Masri
relied on, including the need to dismiss the suit because the
79

Privilege Hearings, supra note 78, at 3.
Jennifer Granick, Secrecy Mustn’t Crush Rule of Law, WIRED, June 21, 2006.
81
See El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535 (E.D. Va. 2006); Privilege
Hearings, supra note 78, at 3. El-Masri is only one of many state secrets privilege
claims which led to dismissal at the pleadings stage. See, e.g., Halkin v. Helms, 598
F.2d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (affirming a partial dismissal of a suit involving domestic
surveillance issues).
82
See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
83
See El-Masri v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007); Linda Greenhouse,
Justices Turn Aside Case of Man Accusing C.I.A. of Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2007,
at A20.
84
Privilege Hearings, supra note 78, at 3.
85
563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009).
86
539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
80
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subject matter at issue was itself a state secret that, if
revealed, could jeopardize national security interests.87 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, adhering closely to the standard as
articulated by the Court in Reynolds and rejecting the
government’s claims that the suit needed to be dismissed
outright based on its subject matter.88 The court instead
remanded the case to the district court, giving the plaintiffs an
opportunity to prosecute their claim without relying on
privileged evidence.89
The dismissal of El-Masri, which was affirmed by the
Fourth Circuit and was subsequently denied certiorari, in
conjunction with the recent Ninth Circuit decision in
Mohamed, make clear that Congress should step in and clarify
the state secrets privilege.90 The current application of the state
secrets privilege raises numerous questions that require
clarification: when the government can invoke the privilege,
and what can be protected from disclosure;91 whether it is
appropriate to grant a motion to dismiss based on a state
secrets claim at the initial pleadings stage;92 the appropriate
relief for a valid claim of the privilege;93 and how deeply the
court must examine the government’s claim.94
More fundamentally, the petition for certiorari by ElMasri reflects broader concerns that the Reynolds framework
should be reevaluated in light of serious constitutional issues—
including allegations of gross violations of the right to privacy
and the right to due process—raised in current cases that were
not present in Reynolds. Additionally, critics have noted that
the nature of national security concerns has changed
significantly in recent decades, and the courts’ ability to

87

Id. at 1134-36.
Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 997, 1009.
89
Id. at 1009. The Ninth Circuit further clarified that documents considered
“classified” for Freedom of Information Act purposes are not necessarily “secret” for
purposes of the state secrets privilege, and that the government had the burden of
establishing the need for genuine secrecy. Id. at 1006-08.
90
It is clearly not in the interest of the executive branch to initiate any
tinkering with the state secrets privilege, since the current application tends to grant
most government requests for dismissal or non-discovery. See Editorial, Secrets and
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at A18 (noting that the proposed Congressional
measures were necessary given the courts’ reflexive dismissal of cases involving
national security issues).
91
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9.
92
Id. at 17-21.
93
Id. at 21-22.
94
Id. at 22-24.
88
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adjudicate cases while protecting sensitive information has
improved dramatically in the decades since Reynolds.95
The El-Masri certiorari petition asserted that it was
time for the Court to revisit the Reynolds standard and the
state secrets privilege generally, arguing that since Reynolds
was decided, the privilege has been broadened inappropriately
and “has become unmoored from its evidentiary origins” and
now provides a type of blanket immunity for bad actions by the
government.96
Indeed, the Bush administration invoked the state
secrets privilege with far greater frequency, in cases of greater
national significance, and sought broader immunity for alleged
bad acts by the government than did previous
administrations.97 It also extended the ability to classify
documents as “secret” to additional administrative agencies.98
These claims of state secrets, as El-Masri noted, have been
raised frequently at the initial pleadings stage, allowing the
government to seek dismissal prior to discovery.99 Further,
courts often have not examined the documents over which the
95

Id. at 28-29 (citing the frameworks for judicial treatment of sensitive
information laid out in the Freedom of Information Act, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, and the Classified Information Procedures Act).
96
Id. at 12.
97
E.g., Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1939 (2007) (“The Bush Administration raised the privilege
in twenty-eight percent [28%] more cases per year than in the previous decade, and has
sought dismissal in ninety-two percent [92%] more cases per year than in the previous
decade.”); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 16, at 100 (claiming that the Bush
administration is using the state secrets privilege with “offhanded abandon”). Compare
Chesney, supra note 51, at 1252 (claiming that a survey of the invocation of the state
secrets privilege in the post-Reynolds era indicates that “recent assertions of the
privilege are not different in kind from the practice of other administrations”), with
Video: Ben Wizner, Staff Attorney, ACLU, Panel Remarks at American Constitution
Society for Law and Policy Discussion: The State Secrets Privilege: Time for Reform?
(2008), available at http://acslaw.org/node/6503 (claiming that the frequent invocation
of the state secrets privilege to secure dismissal at the initial pleadings stage is unique
to the Bush administration).
98
See Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 1, at 9 (noting that the ability to
classify documents as “secret” and, therefore, potentially shield them from disclosure in
litigation, to the department of Health and Human Services, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Department of Agriculture, and the Office of Science and
Technology Policy).
99
See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217
(D. Or. 2006); ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Terkel v.
AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F.
Supp. 2d 974, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2006); see also Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F.
Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004) (invoking the privilege to terminate a whistleblower suit by
an FBI translator who was retaliated against); William F. Jasper, Shooting the
Messenger, NEW AM., July 7, 2008, at 20 (detailing the level of retaliation against Sibel
Edmonds and her inability to seek recourse in the courts).
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privilege has been claimed, relying solely on government
affidavits to determine that the privilege applies and that the
suit must be dismissed prior to the commencement of
discovery.100 Given the likelihood of continued litigation raising
issues of national security for the foreseeable future, reassessing Reynolds in light of modern standards is necessary.101
C.

Proposed Reforms

The 2008 and 2009 proposed reforms mark the first
sustained attempt by Congress to address the concerns of
lawmakers, scholars, and activists to allow courts greater
flexibility in their evaluation and application of the privilege
while protecting sensitive government information.102
Both the 2009 Senate and House bills offer a uniform
set of procedures for federal judges to employ when the
government asserts the privilege, modeled in large part after
the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) of 1980,
which established procedures for the use of classified
information in criminal trials.103
Under the proposed legislation, courts would have the
ability to conduct hearings on the documents claimed to be
privileged in camera, ex parte, or through the participation of
attorneys and legal experts with “appropriate security
100

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 14.
Critics have argued for many years that the state secrets privilege needs to
be clarified for courts to apply a consistent standard. See, e.g., Sandra D. Jordan,
Classified Information and Conflicts in Independent Counsel Prosecutions: Balancing
the Scales of Justice After Iran-Contra, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1651, 1679 (1991).
102
Courts have held that statutes can preempt the application of the state
secrets privilege. See, e.g., Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 37, 44 (2d Cir. 1958)
(noting that the Invention Secrecy Act should govern the court’s treatment of sensitive
evidence instead of the state secrets privilege); In re NSA Telecomm. Records Litig.,
564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) has primacy over the state secrets privilege in setting forth the
parameters of how evidence should be treated during litigation); see also Eric
Lichtblau, Judge Rejects Bush’s View on Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2008, at A17
(noting FISA’s limitations on executive branch activities).
103
18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2006). The Bush administration has pointed out
that analogizing the use of the state secrets privilege to the application of the CIPA is
inapposite, since the end result of nondisclosure of government held evidence under
CIPA is that the government would need to drop its prosecution of a criminal case; in a
state secrets situation, the proposed reforms would mean that government
nondisclosure after a court order would lead to an adverse inference which increases
the likelihood of government liability to private litigants. See Letter from Michael B.
Mukasey, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 31, 2008) [hereinafter Mukasey Letter], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ola/views-letters/110-2/03-31-08-ag-ltr-re-s2533-statesecrets.pdf.
101
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clearances” to review the materials.104 The bills also require the
government to produce each piece of evidence it claims is
protected for in camera review, along with a signed affidavit
from the head of the agency in possession of the evidence.105 The
Senate bill also requires the government to attempt to produce
a non-privileged substitute—such as a redaction or summary—
for any piece of evidence for which the privilege is upheld by
the court.106
These proposed reforms mark a stark contrast to the
current situation in which the government’s common practice
is to rely solely on affidavits to assert the privilege and move
for dismissal of a suit.107 Judges would be prevented from
dismissing cases based on the privilege before plaintiffs have
had a chance to engage in evidentiary discovery,108 and the level
of deference to be accorded to the executive branch would
change from the current standard of giving the “utmost
deference”109 to administration claims to one in which judges
give only “substantial weight” to such claims.110
D.

Critiques and Concerns Over Reforming the Privilege

The 2008 proposed reforms were met with immediate
and strong opposition from the Bush administration. In a
March 31, 2008, letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
104

S. 417, 111th Cong. § 4052 (2009). The bill empowers the judiciary to
implement procedures to ensure that a sufficient number of attorneys with high-level
security clearances are available to assist with such cases. Id.
105
Id. § 4052(b)(1) (providing for in camera hearings except in when the
hearing relates solely to a question of law). The court can choose to review only a
sampling of the documents in question, if the review of every document would be
prohibitively time-consuming. Id. § 4054(d)(2).
106
Id. § 4054(e)(2)(B).
107
See James Oliphant, Committee Passes “State Secrets” Bill, SWAMP, Apr.
24, 2008, http://www.swamppolitics.com/news/politics/blog/2008/04/committee_passes
_state_secrets.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2009). S. 417 section 4054(b) requires that
the government also provide an affidavit to support a claim of state secrets, and that
an unclassified version of the affidavit must be made public.
108
Id. § 4055 (“After reviewing all pertinent evidence, privileged and nonprivileged, a Federal court may dismiss a claim or counterclaim on the basis of the
state secrets privilege . . . .”).
109
“[U]tmost deference” was also the standard accorded to executive claims of
privilege in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 685 (1974).
110
See S. 2533, 110th Cong. § 4054(e)(3) (as reported by Senator Patrick J.
Leahy, with an amendment, Aug. 1, 2008). Finally, the Attorney General would have
been obligated to report to Congress within 30 calendar days “on any case in which . . .
the state secrets privilege” was invoked, and any member of the House and Senate
Intelligence and Judiciary Committees would have been permitted to request and
examine any piece of evidence deemed protected by a court. Id. § 4058(a)(1).
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then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey offered numerous
critiques, including that the state secrets privilege is
constitutionally rooted, and not solely a common law
evidentiary privilege;111 that the courts are not the appropriate
decision-makers regarding national security matters;112 that
other aspects of S. 2533, including reporting requirements to
Congress, are constitutionally suspect;113 and that the proposed
reforms would compromise the state secrets privilege to the
detriment of national security.114
First, the Bush administration offered the Article IIbased argument that congressional regulation of the privilege
is overreaching because the state secrets privilege is not a
purely evidentiary privilege for which the parameters can be
set by Congress.115 Instead, the Bush administration and other
critics argued that the state secrets privilege is grounded in the
President’s inherent executive power,116 a position articulated
by the Supreme Court in the dicta of United States v. Nixon,117
and mentioned in passing in a footnote in Reynolds.118
111

Mukasey Letter, supra note 103, at 2-3.
Id. at 3-4.
113
Id. at 4-5.
114
Id. at 5-6. The Mukasey Letter also detailed four other concerns: that the
state secrets privilege is a well-settled doctrine, the Reynolds standard was appropriate
for evaluating a claim of privilege, the proposed reforms could affect pending litigation,
and the proposed amendments lacked clarity as to classification procedures. Id. at 1, 2, 7.
115
See, e.g., El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535-36 (E.D. Va. 2006)
(asserting that the “privilege derived from the President’s constitutional authority over
the conduct of this country’s diplomatic and military affairs”); Memorandum in Support
of the United States’ Assertion of State Secrets Privilege at 3-4, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F.
Supp. 2d 258 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 04-CV-249); Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of the United States’ Assertion of the Military and State Secrets Privilege;
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment; and
Defendants’ Motion to Stay Consideration of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
at 10, ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 2:06-cv-10204)
(arguing that the “privilege derives from the President’s Article II powers to conduct
foreign affairs and provide for the national defense”); see also Chesney, supra note 51,
at 1308-09 (asserting that the state secrets privilege is best conceived of as an Article II
privilege with an overlay of evidentiary issues, the latter of which can be regulated by
Congress).
116
See generally JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE (2005) (arguing
that inherent executive authority during wartime limits Congressional control over the
conduct of war to the exercise of its spending and impeachment powers).
117
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) (“Nowhere in the
Constitution . . . is there any explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to
the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers, it is
constitutionally based.”); see Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (“[The
President’s] authority to classify and control access to information bearing on national
security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a
position in the Executive Branch that will give that person access to such information
flows primarily from this constitutional investment of power in the President . . . .”);
112
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Since Reynolds, most courts have construed the state
secrets privilege simply as a common law evidentiary privilege,
created and enforced to protect information when “disclosure
would be inimical to the national security [interests].”119 In
2005, the Court decided Tenet v. Doe120 and made clear the
distinction between applying the state secrets privilege and
deciding the threshold question of justiciability. In Tenet, two
foreign nationals who allegedly worked on behalf of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in return for the promise of financial
support and residency in the United States brought claims
against the CIA.121 The Supreme Court dismissed the claims of
the alleged agents based squarely on the justiciability doctrine
announced in Totten v. United States rather than looking to the
state secrets privilege for guidance.122 In the course of its
reasoning in Tenet, the Court clarified that the state secrets
privilege addressed in Reynolds ought to be viewed as purely
evidentiary123 in nature.124
El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 303-04 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that the state
secrets privilege has a “firm foundation in the Constitution”); Halkin v. Helms, 598
F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Black v. Sheraton Corp. of Am., 371 F. Supp. 97, 100 (D.D.C.
1974) (noting that the privilege is constitutionally based to maintain an appropriate
separation of powers).
118
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 n.9 (1953) (noting that the
government claims that the statute determining whether the government can withhold
documents “is only a legislative recognition of an inherent executive power which is
protected in the constitutional system of separation of power”).
119
In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re NSA
Telecomm. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Hepting v.
AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980-85 (N.D. Cal. 2006); see also Al-Haramain
Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The state secrets
privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that permits the government to bar the
disclosure of information if ‘there is a reasonable danger’ that disclosure will ‘expose
military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.’”
(quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10)).
120
544 U.S. 1 (2005).
121
Id. at 3-5.
122
Id. at 8-10 (relying on Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875)).
123
Other supporters of the 2008 proposed reforms argued that whether the
privilege has some constitutional roots is irrelevant, since the proposed reforms seek to
impose the cost of an adverse inference against the government if it does not comply
with a judicial request for in camera review, but that the government does not
necessarily lose its case. See Aziz Huq, Dir. Liberty & Nat’l Sec. Project, Brennan Ctr.
For Justice, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Remarks at the American Constitution Society for
Law and Policy Panel Discussion: The State Secrets Privilege: Time for Reform? (Apr.
4, 2008), available at http://acslaw.org/node/6578. The adverse inference also costs less
than the remedy applied by the district court in Reynolds, which entered judgment for
the plaintiffs upon the government’s refusal to produce the flight accident report for in
camera review. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 5.
124
The Tenet Court distinguished the evidentiary privilege from the
justiciability doctrine articulated in Totten, 92 U.S. at 107 (in which litigation was
dismissed at the pleading stage in an action to enforce a secret espionage contract,
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Second, the Bush administration argued that the state
secrets privilege is best exercised by the executive branch,
which is owed a high level of deference on national security
matters.125 For example, the government, in asking the
Supreme Court not to grant El-Masri’s petition for certiorari,
cited Nixon for the proposition that “[s]uch deference protects
the Executive’s Article II responsibility to safeguard national
security information and accounts for the fact that the
Executive Branch is in a far better position than the courts to
evaluate the national security and diplomatic consequences of
releasing sensitive information.”126
This argument relied on the premise that judges cannot
adequately evaluate some issues that relate to national
security matters.127 The district court in El-Masri emphasized
this purported judicial deficiency, quoting from the 1948 case of
C. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,128 “the President . . .
has available intelligence services whose reports are not and
ought not to be published to the world. It would be intolerable
that courts, without the relevant information, should review
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on
information properly held secret.”129
This claim—which if followed to its logical conclusion
would preclude judicial oversight of almost all national security
matters—is questionable, since federal courts are regularly
tasked with dealing with sensitive information related to
national security issues.130 Further, the ability of the courts to
because the government could neither confirm nor deny the contract’s existence),
describing Totten as “unique and categorical . . . a rule designed not merely to defeat
the asserted claims, but to preclude judicial inquiry.” Tenet, 544 U.S. at 6 n.4. By
contrast, the Court described the state secrets privilege as dealing strictly with
evidence, not justiciability. Id. at 9-10.
125
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (reasoning that courts
“traditionally show” the “utmost deference” to executive branch requests for privilege).
126
Brief for the United States in Opposition at 14, El-Masri v. United States,
128 S. Ct. 373 (2007) (No. 06-0613), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/statesec/
elmasri-govt-opp.pdf (citing Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710).
127
See Chesney, supra note 51, at 1267-69.
128
333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
129
El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 536 n.7 (E.D. Va. 2006).
130
See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008) (affirming the role of
the judiciary in determining constitutionality of counterterrorism measures, noting,
“Security depends upon a sophisticated intelligence apparatus and the ability of our
Armed Forces to act and to interdict. There are further considerations, however.
Security subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom’s first principles.”); see also Weiser, supra
note 68 (noting the observation of Second Circuit Judge Barrington Parker, Jr. that
courts regularly weigh in on questions of foreign policy); State Secret Protection Act of
2009: Hearing on H.R. 984 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and
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deal with sophisticated and sensitive matters of national
importance has increased dramatically since the Reynolds
decision.131 Additionally, the status quo reflects little or no
judicial check on executive branch overreaching; the proposed
reforms attempt to rectify that by shedding sunlight on
executive branch decision-making that would not exist
otherwise. Although involved executive branch officials would
have a better and more nuanced understanding of national
security issues than federal judges, the conclusion that judges
are thus incompetent to play any significant role in the
application of an evidentiary privilege—even with the
protections of in camera review—does not follow.
Third, the Bush administration strongly objected132 to
the proposed requirement that the Attorney General report to
Congress on invocations of the state secret privilege and
provide copies of privileged documents to members of Congress
upon request.133 Any President who subscribes to a robust view
of a unilateralist unitary executive theory134—particularly in
light of the claim that the state secrets privilege has an Article
II core—may decide to refuse to comply with the legislated
state secrets framework based on the theory of constitutional
Civil Liberties, 111th Cong. 24-25 (2009) (statement of Hon. Patricia M. Wald, Retired
C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia) (asserting that federal courts
are capable of handling sensitive information related to national security issues).
Federal courts have dealt effectively with serious national security issues, such as
terrorism, for many years. E.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 171 (2d Cir. 2003)
(affirming convictions for conspiracy to attack the World Trade Center in 1993); United
States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming the death sentence
for Timothy McVeigh for his role in the 1993 Oklahoma City bombing).
131
Various developments have contributed to this trend. One development
includes the 1958 amendments to the Federal Housekeeping Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 301
(2006). See Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 777 (9th
Cir. 1994) (“According to the legislative history of the 1958 amendments, Congress
was concerned that the statute had been twisted from its original purpose as a
‘housekeeping’ statute into a claim of authority to keep information from the public
and, even, from the Congress. 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3352 (1958).” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); id. (“The House Report accompanying the 1958
amendment explained that the proposed amendment would ‘correct’ a situation that
had arisen in which the executive branch was using the housekeeping statute as a
substantive basis to withhold information from the public. H.R. REP. NO. 85-1461, at
2 (1958).”). Other developments include the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of
Information Act, the 1978 creation of the Foreign Intelligence Services Act Court,
and the 1980 passage of CIPA. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 124-64; THE
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, REFORMING THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE 5 (2007),
available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/52.pdf.
132
See Mukasey Letter, supra note 103, at 4-5.
133
See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009) (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 4058).
134
See Setty, supra note 46, at 596-98.
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avoidance.135 If Congress attempted to mandate the Attorney
General’s reporting to Congress on information related to
national security, the President may choose to “avoid” a
potential constitutional question by refusing to enforce the
legislation mandating the sharing of information.136 However,
because the judiciary has a central role in evaluating and
applying the state secrets privilege, the use of avoidance by the
executive branch may be limited to some extent.137
Fourth, the administration raised the concern that the
proposed reforms, if enacted, would lead to the disclosure of
135

Constitutional avoidance in the executive context has been understood to
mean that the President can “avoid” a constitutional dispute by asserting his own view
of his constitutional obligations any time the actions of another branch make an
incursion onto the constitutional right of the executive to exert its decision-making
primacy in certain areas, such as in the conduct of war. See Trevor Morrison,
Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1218-19,
1230 (2006) (critiquing the OLC’s use of avoidance to assert more presidential power
than is granted under law). Congress attempted to address the question of
constitutional avoidance through 2002 appropriations legislation that included a
provision mandating notification to Congress whenever the executive branch chooses
not to enforce a law as written. See The 21st Century Department of Justice
Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273 § 202, 116 Stat. 1758, 1771
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 530(D) (2002)). The Bush administration appears to have
engaged in “meta-avoidance” by refusing to comply with the congressional notification
requirement in the Act. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the 21st Century Dep’t of
Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1971, 1971
(Nov. 2, 2002) (noting that § 530(D) “purports to impose on the executive branch
substantial obligations for reporting to the Congress activities of the Department of
Justice involving challenges to or nonenforcement of law that conflicts with the
Constitution. The executive branch shall construe section 530(D) . . . in a manner
consistent with the constitutional authorities of the President to supervise the unitary
executive branch . . . .”). Congress continues to attempt to legislate its way around
executive branch avoidance. E.g., OLC Reporting Act of 2008, S. 3501, 110th Cong. § 2
(2008) (introduced by Sens. Feingold and Feinstein); Office of Legal Counsel Reporting
Act of 2008, H.R. 6929, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008) (introduced by Rep. Miller). Both bills
propose amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 530(D) to obligate the Attorney General to report
to Congress on non-enforcement of statutes based on OLC opinions claiming
constitutional avoidance based on the OLC’s reading of presidential power under
Article II.
136
Morrison, supra note 135, at 1250-58. Members of Congress,
acknowledging the ineffectiveness of Congressional oversight in the face of the
heightened use of executive privilege and constitutional avoidance, have voiced the
belief that the courts are the last safeguards of separation of powers. Department of
Justice Oversight: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 5, 13-14
(2007) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing Transcript] (statements of Chairman Sen. Leahy
and Att’y Gen. Gonzales). Senator Arlen Specter has objected to this meta-use of
constitutional avoidance, noting that even if enforcement of a statute is “avoided” by
the administration, that avoidance needs to be reported to the appropriate committee
in the Senate and House of Representatives. Id. at 13.
137
It should be noted that there is no layer of judicial oversight for the
provision of S. 2533 which requires the Attorney General to report to Congress and
provide documents for inspection which were withheld under the privilege. See S. REP.
NO. 110-442, at 33-35 (2008). Thus, an administration intent on using the avoidance
doctrine might do so in the context of this congressional reporting requirement.
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more state secrets and compromise national security as a
result.138 Clearly, more information would likely be revealed in
litigation if the proposed reforms were enacted: S. 417 elevates
the threshold for nondisclosure from “a reasonable danger” that
disclosure could harm national security—the standard from
Reynolds139—to the higher standard that disclosure is
“reasonably likely to cause significant harm” to national
security.140 A higher rate of disclosure would be almost
inevitable with the proposed standard, particularly given that
the courts, not the executive branch, would make the final
determination as to the level of potential harm caused by
disclosure.
However, it is unclear whether a higher rate of
disclosure would jeopardize U.S. security interests. Although
the Bush administration asserted that disclosing information
regarding administration activities in the war on terror in
response to oversight attempts would compromise national
security interests,141 it offered no evidence supporting such a
claim.142 Further, although then-Attorney General Mukasey

138

The court in El-Masri acknowledged the potential danger to national
security in disclosing state secrets during litigation. 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 537 (E.D. Va.
2006) (“[A]ny admission of denial of [the] allegations by defendants in this case would
reveal the means and methods employed pursuant to this clandestine [wiretapping]
program and such a revelation would present a grave risk of injury to national
security.”).
139
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 101 (1953).
140
See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009) (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 4051).
141
See Setty, supra note 46, at 612; Prepared Statement of Hon. Alberto R.
Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States (2006), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/020606gonzales.html;
Heidi
Kitrosser,
Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information
Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1056 (2008) (“[T]he administration has offered no
explanation of the purported dangers of revealing the program’s very existence beyond
the vague assertion that, while terrorists surely already know that the United States
can survey their conversations, knowing about the program would remind them of this
fact and might lead them to infer that surveillance is broader than they had assumed.”
(footnotes omitted)); Bruce Ackerman, Terrorism and the Constitutional Order, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 478-79 (2006) (arguing that the rhetoric surrounding the war on
terror encourages a public and congressional overreaction of ceding powers to the
President); see also Joby Warrick & Dan Eggen, Hill Briefed on Waterboarding in 2002,
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2007, at A1 (offering a second reason for the desire for secrecy: to
avoid public and international censure over the use of the harsh interrogation
techniques. When the U.S. interrogation program became known widely in late 2006,
the uproar from Congress and the public apparently prompted the administration to
modify its program.).
142
See Setty, supra note 46, at 613 (noting that repeated claims by the Bush
administration that Office of Legal Counsel opinions could not be disclosed because of a
purported risk to national security were unsupported and ultimately undermined by
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framed the reforms as creating a “Hobson’s Choice of either
disclosing classified activities or losing cases,”143 this overstates
the effect of overhauling the Reynolds standard. The proposed
legislation would not have mandated government liability if
relevant evidence were not disclosed to the court, nor would it
have required the government to turn over the evidence to a
plaintiff after a court determination that the evidence is not
privileged. The actual detriment to the government would have
been a finding of contempt and an adverse inference against
the government’s case.
The Bush administration wanted to see a continuation
of the status quo, and believed that the deferential Reynolds
standard was preferable to creating a stronger judicial
oversight mechanism. To date, the common application of
Reynolds is what still governs, and it is unclear whether the
Obama administration and a Democratic Congress will pass
legislation to address the process and rule-of-law problems that
Reynolds has engendered. To evaluate whether Reynolds and
its progeny offer the appropriate standard to apply,144 however,
it is useful to look back at how the U.S. state secrets privilege
evolved to its current state.
II.

THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. STATE
SECRETS PRIVILEGE

There is little doubt that the U.S. version of the state
secrets privilege arose from international sources but has
evolved independently, particularly since the Reynolds decision
in 1953. Both the English and Scottish origins of the privilege,
as well as the development of the U.S. state secrets doctrine,
provide context for evaluating the proposed domestic reforms to
the privilege.
A.

The U.K. Origins of the U.S. State Secrets Privilege

Although precedent from England was not the only legal
basis for the Reynolds decision, it played an instrumental role
for the Supreme Court, which had little domestic doctrine to
the Bush administration’s own eventual disclosure of the legal policies); Editorial,
Politics, Pure and Cynical, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at A22.
143
Mukasey Letter, supra note 103, at 6.
144
Id. at 1-2, 7 (arguing that Reynolds and the cases following that have been
deferential to the executive branch articulate the appropriate standard for determining
claims of the state secrets privilege).
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rely upon. However, what the Reynolds court viewed as simply
English precedent actually represented two distinct and, to
some extent, contrary legal precedents from England and
Scotland.
1. English Precedent
The first indication that crown privilege145 extended to
protect the government against disclosure of state secrets can
be found during the reign of Charles I of England.146 The heart
of the privilege is to protect the public interest by keeping
sensitive information out of public purview.147 In Charles I’s
time, the privilege was used to prevent courts from gaining
jurisdiction over habeas corpus claims of prisoners unless the
Crown agreed to show cause for the detention.148 This was a
controversial proposition since habeas rights had existed since
the time of the Magna Carta.149 Even at the time, commentators
argued that the Crown was abusing its privilege and that the
rule of law and government accountability were at grave risk.150
The Crown’s position on habeas rights was overturned
by the Petition of Right of 1628, which forbade Charles I from
divesting the courts of jurisdiction over matters of arrest and
detention.151 However, the notion of a state secrets privilege
over security-related information was established and
uncontested by Parliament or the courts in future years.152 Still,
the scope and parameters of the privilege remained murky
even through the 1800s: while some judges believed that a
court could invoke the privilege sua sponte even absent a

145

Crown privilege is one of the crown prerogatives, defined by Blackstone as
“those [powers] which [the crown] enjoys alone.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 266, 269 (London, A. Strahan & W. Woodfall, 12th ed. 1793-95).
146
Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 1, at 13.
147
Id. at 14-15.
148
Id. at 17.
149
Id. at 19 (citing Magna Carta ¶ 39 (1215)).
150
Id. at 22.
151
Id. at 23.
152
Id. at 23-26 (citing Trial of the Seven Bishops, 12 How. St. Tr. 183, 309-11
(1688) (refusing to require a witness to testify as to the proceedings of a Privy Council
meeting); Layer’s Case, 16 How. St. Tr. 94, 223-24 (1722) (denying a witness’s request
to have Privy Council proceedings revealed in court); Bishop Atterbury’s Case, 16 How.
St. Tr. 323, 495 (1723) (precluding testimony before the House of Lords regarding
encrypted communications); The Trial of Maha Rajah Nundocomar, 20 How. St. Tr.
923, 1057 (1775) (denying the claim of privilege over Privy Council records)).
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government claim of privilege,153 others questioned the erosion
of individual rights and the rule of law in the face of the
government’s ability to hide relevant and potentially damaging
information.154
Two English decisions—one in the 1860s and the other
in the 1940s—were decisive in clarifying the state secrets
privilege in England and laying the groundwork for the
parameters of the U.S. state secrets privilege as laid out in
Reynolds. In the 1860 case of Beatson v. Skene,155 the court
found that “if the production of a State paper would be
injurious to the public service, the general public interest must
be considered paramount to the individual interest of a suitor
in a court of justice.”156 Beatson further broadened the power of
the government by stating that the judiciary should defer to
the head of the government department with custody of the
paper to determine whether to disclose the document.157
The doctrine of the state secrets privilege was not
substantially revisited until the 1942 case of Duncan v.
Cammel, Laird & Co. (“Cammel Laird”),158 a key case cited to
support an expansive reading of the privilege by the Reynolds
court. In Cammel Laird, the House of Lords followed the
reasoning of Beatson to clarify the English standard for public
interest immunity. The facts of Cammel Laird are remarkably
similar to those of Reynolds: a British submarine sank in 1939
during sea trials, which resulted in the death of ninety-nine
people.159 The families of the sailors who had been killed
claimed damages from the builders, Cammel, Laird & Co.
153

E.g., Anderson v. Hamilton, 2 Brod. & B. 156 (1818) (in a suit for false
imprisonment, Lord Ellenborough denied the plaintiff’s request to compel production of
correspondence between government officials, even absent a government objection to
the production, noting that “the breach of the privilege given by the law to such
communications would be highly dangerous to the interests of the state”); see also
Chesney, supra note 51, at 1275-76; Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 1, at 28.
154
Gugy v. Maguire, 13 Low. Can. 33, 38 (1863) (Mondolet, J., dissenting) (“I
can not, I ought not for a moment, as a judge living and administering justice under
constitutional institutions, admit such a monstrous doctrine . . . . A doctrine which
reduces the judge on the Bench to an automaton, who . . . will bend at the bidding of
any reckless politician . . . . If that doctrine be law . . . it would be appalling. It would
be such that no one would feel himself secure.”).
155
(1860) 157 Eng. Rep. 1415.
156
Id. at 1421.
157
Id. at 1421-22 (noting that if the head of a department “states that in his
opinion the production of the document would be injurious to the public service, we
think the Judge ought not to compel the production of it”).
158
[1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.).
159
Id. at 625-26.
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The House of Lords upheld an affidavit issued by the
British Admiralty claiming that public interest immunity
precluded disclosure of the plans of the submarine,160 and
affirmed the rule of Beatson that the courts should take an
affidavit claiming public interest immunity at face value:
“Those who are responsible for the national security must be
the sole judges of what the national security requires.”161 The
Lords further held that if a government officer offers a good
faith affidavit as to the need for nondisclosure, then “the judge
ought not to compel the production of it.”162
In reasoning through the secrecy dilemma, the Lords
first attempted to determine whether the question of the
appropriateness of in camera review of the disputed
information was a matter of first impression.163 Counsel for the
government said that it was not, relying on the Scottish case of
Earl v. Vass164 for the proposition that courts need not conduct
an independent review of the materials. Specifically, the Lords
agreed with the Vass court’s reasoning that the privilege was
absolute when invoked by the government and that the
government’s good faith determination of nondisclosure was
sufficient.165 The Cammel Laird court went on to note that such
deference to the government would result in an information
imbalance between the Crown and other litigants, but that
such an imbalance was necessary to preserve the public
interest.166
The Cammel Laird court also looked at Admiralty
Commissioners v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling,167 in which the
Inner House of the Court of Session “insisted that the view of
the government department was final.”168 The Cammel Laird
court also relied upon the reasoning of Aberdeen Steam to
support the conclusion that the government was better suited
to make the final determination of privilege because a court
160

Id. at 626-27. The court noted that the First Lord of the Admiralty offered
a sworn affidavit that he and his technical advisers examined the documents being
requested and determined for themselves that disclosure would be injurious to the
public interest. Id.
161
Id. at 641 (internal quotations omitted).
162
Id. at 639.
163
Id. at 627-28.
164
(1822) 1 Shaw 229.
165
Cammel Laird, [1942] A.C. at 631-32.
166
Id. at 633.
167
Admiralty Comm’rs v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling & Fishing Co., (1908)
1909 S.C. 335 (Scot. 1st Div.).
168
Cammel Laird, [1942] A.C. at 639-40.
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may find certain information “innocuous,” whereas government
officials who properly understand the context of the
information would know better169—one of the same arguments
offered by the Bush administration in opposition to the
Senate’s current proposed reforms.170
The appellants argued that the Lords should undertake
an in camera review of the documents in question prior to
making a final determination as to whether the public interest
immunity applied, to make sure that an impartial party—the
judges—could appropriately balance the need to maintain state
security against the possible injustice of nondisclosure suffered
by an individual litigant.171 The appellants further pointed out
the inherent conflict of interest in asking government officials
to make their own determination as to whether a document
ought to be disclosed.172 The Lords found neither argument
persuasive,173 ultimately holding that “[t]he practice in
Scotland, as in England, may have varied, but the approved
practice in both countries is to treat a ministerial objection
taken in proper form as conclusive.”174
Critics have decried the result of Cammel Laird on two
fronts—first, that the decision cemented the English rule of
giving “carte blanche to crown privilege;”175 and second, that
Cammel Laird’s rationale was faulty because it erroneously
relied on the Scottish case law176 to defend a broad, deferential
state secrets privilege.177 If Cammel Laird was erroneously
decided, then—some argue—the U.S. Supreme Court’s reliance
on English law in Reynolds becomes less well-founded.178

169

Id. at 640-41.
See Mukasey Letter, supra note 103, at 3-4. Mukasey argued that national
security officials “occupy a position superior to that of the courts in evaluating the
consequences of a release of sensitive information.” Id. at 3 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
171
Cammel Laird, [1942] A.C. at 627-28.
172
Id. at 628.
173
Id. at 636-38 (noting the need for a broad public interest immunity to
encourage unhindered discussion among government officials).
174
Id. at 641.
175
ROBERT STEVENS, THE ENGLISH JUDGES: THEIR ROLE IN THE CHANGING
CONSTITUTION 27 (Hart 2d ed. 2005).
176
Earl v. Vass, (1822) 1 S.C. (S.) 229.
177
Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 1, at 31-32.
178
Id. at 32.
170
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2. Scottish Precedent
Although the court in Cammel Laird relied on Vass and
Aberdeen Steam, Scottish law has always had a considerably
narrower view of the state secret privilege than England. In
Scotland, the privilege was retained as a limited crown
privilege, rather than the broad public interest exception that
is embodied in English law.179
In fact, the application of the state secrets privilege in
Scotland has differed greatly from England since at least the
eighteenth century. The Scottish courts consistently used a
balancing approach between the need to maintain national
security and the need for democratic accountability and
individual rights. That balancing test yielded a much greater
diversity in results than the deferential English standard. For
example, in the 1727 case of Stevens v. Dundas, the court
compelled production of documents over the government’s
objections.180 In the 1818 case of Leven v. Young, the court
affirmed that the judiciary—not the government ministers—
have the right to make an independent determination as to
whether the privilege should allow for nondisclosure of relevant
information.181 On the other hand, when applying this balancing
standard on a case-by-case basis, Scottish courts stated that
the party seeking sensitive information was required to show a
significant level of necessity for the court to order disclosure.182
Both Vass and Aberdeen Steam included language that
supported a significant deference toward the executive in
determining when the privilege should apply. However, it
should have been clear to the House of Lords in Cammel Laird
that Scottish law on the application of the privilege differed
greatly from English law by assigning a much greater role for
the judiciary. Nonetheless, the English court conflated the
English and Scottish standards in Cammel Laird, arguably
creating the faulty standard that set the stage for Reynolds.

179

E.g., Whitehall v. Whitehall, [1957] S.C. (H.L.) 30, 37-38.
See 19 W.M. MORISON, DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF SESSIONS 7905 (1804)
(discussing the Stevens case).
181
See Leven v. Young, (1818) 1 Murray 350, 370 (Scot. 1st Div.).
182
Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 1, at 37 (citations omitted).
180

232

B.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1

History of the U.S. State Secrets Privilege

Prior to Reynolds, U.S. jurisprudence on the state
secrets privilege was limited and vague, and failed to set forth
a standardized doctrine by which privilege claims ought to be
evaluated. Some scholars argue that the state secrets privilege
simply did not exist in U.S. jurisprudence prior to Reynolds,183
but some evidence does exist that courts accepted the general
notion of executive privilege, albeit in the specific context of an
informer’s privilege184 and deliberative privilege,185 not a state
secrets privilege. As early as Marbury v. Madison, the Court
mentions the existence of presidential prerogatives not
delineated in the Constitution,186 but does not clarify the nature
or extent of those prerogatives. In accepting a presidential
prerogative as a natural derivation of the Crown privilege, the
Court did not acknowledge the significantly different nature of
the Crown or the judiciary in England; unlike U.S. judges,
English judges were not independent from Parliament after
being appointed.187 Ironically, Marbury is best known for
formalizing the U.S. doctrine of judicial review, but the
decision operated under the assumption that there were
certain executive privileges that may be beyond the purview of
the judiciary.
Soon after Marbury, the Court in United States v. Burr,
in analyzing the defendant’s constitutional right to subpoena
witnesses and evidence in support of his defense, noted that
the government’s right to refuse disclosure of evidence did not
turn on whether revealing the document would “endanger the
public safety.”188 However, the question of government
nondisclosure did not actually arise in Burr.189 The Jefferson
administration did not attempt to withhold any documents
183

Id. at 43.
Chesney, supra note 51, at 1280 (describing an informer’s privilege as one
which “shields evidence of communications between informers and government officials
to encourage such disclosures”).
185
Id. at 1274 (describing the deliberative process privilege as one which
“provides qualified protection to some government communications to facilitate
internal discussions and operations”).
186
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 169-70 (1803).
187
Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 51, at 40.
188
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,682d).
189
Some scholars have argued that the mention in Burr of the government’s
right to nondisclosure of evidence hints at the court’s belief that public safety ought to
be taken into account when making determinations of whether evidentiary disclosure
ought to be ordered. See Chesney, supra note 51, at 1272-73.
184
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from production to the court;190 the court stated both that “it
need only be said that the question [of invoking a privilege to
prevent disclosure of evidence] does not occur at this time,”191
and that “[i]f [a document] does contain any matter which it
would be imprudent to disclose, which it is not the wish of the
executive to disclose, such matter, if it be not immediately and
essentially applicable to the point, will, of course, be
suppressed.”192 Almost twenty years later, an influential
treatise on evidentiary law mentions the existence of a
privilege based on public policy, noting that some evidence “is
excluded because disclosure might be prejudicial to the
community.”193
The nature of a state secrets privilege remained
relatively static until the 1875 Supreme Court decision of
Totten v. United States.194 The plaintiff in Totten brought suit to
enforce an alleged government contract for espionage during
the Civil War;195 the Supreme Court held that it was
inappropriate for the lower court to hear the case in the first
place, since “public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit
in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to
the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as
confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the
confidence to be violated.”196 Totten embodied the idea that some
claims against the government are simply not justiciable based
on the nature of the claim being made and the need for
government secrecy.197
However, the relevance of Totten to the state secrets
privilege is open to debate. Although the Reynolds Court cited
190

Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 1, at 46 (citing 11 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 241 (Thomas Jefferson Mem’l Ass’n of the U.S., 1904)).
191
Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37 (Chief Justice Marshall also offered the following on
a potential presidential privilege regarding evidentiary disclosure obligations: “What
ought to be done under such circumstances present[s] a delicate question, the
discussion of which, it is hoped, will never be rendered necessary in this country.”); see
LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER
AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 212-20 (2006).
192
Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37.
193
See Chesney, supra note 51, at 1273-75 (citing THOMAS STARKIE, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AND DIGEST OF PROOFS IN CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 106 (Boston, Wells & Lilly ed. 1826)).
194
92 U.S. 105 (1875).
195
Id. at 105-06.
196
Id.
197
Some describe Totten as standing for a narrow doctrine covering espionage
agreements, and distinguishable from the state secrets doctrine. See Ilann M. Maazel,
The State Secrets Privilege, N.Y. L.J., Jul. 24, 2008, at 3.
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to Totten as evidence that an evidentiary privilege against
revealing state secrets existed,198 the Supreme Court stated
unequivocally in 2005 that Totten does not involve the state
secrets privilege.199 The Court in Tenet found that Totten dealt
with baseline questions of justiciability, and the state secrets
privilege as articulated in Reynolds required a balancing test
for the admissibility of evidence, which may or may not
necessitate dismissal of a case.200
Even setting Totten aside as distinct from the state
secrets privilege,201 the application of a national security-related
privilege is found in several cases in the early twentieth
century.202 Other national-security cases involved the invocation
of a state secrets privilege in the criminal context. For example,
in United States v. Haugen,203 a district court acquitted a
defendant charged with forgery while working under a military
contract, based largely on the fact that the contract in question
could not be compelled for production by the government.204
Although each of these cases dealt with the question of how to
handle state secrets in the litigation context, they did so
without a judicial or legislative standard or unifying doctrine in
place.
After World War II, the number of lawsuits involving
questions of state secrets increased significantly, largely due to
the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act,205 which
permitted individuals to sue the government for allegedly
tortious conduct. This development set the stage for the
198

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1952).
See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 10 (2005).
200
See id. at 8-11. The Court in Tenet noted that, in Reynolds, Totten was
distinguished as having been “dismissed on the pleadings without ever reaching the
question of evidence, since it was so obvious that the action should never prevail over
the privilege.” Id. at 9. The Court further distinguished Reynolds from Totten, noting
that “[t]he state secrets privilege and the more frequent use of in camera judicial
proceedings simply cannot provide the absolute protection we found necessary in
enunciating the Totten rule.” Id. at 10.
201
But see Chesney, supra note 51, at 1278 (arguing that Totten is properly
viewed as part of the spectrum of possible determinations after a government claim of
state secrets privilege).
202
E.g., Pollen v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 673, 674, 680-81, 684 (Ct. Cl. 1937)
(dismissing a suit involving gun designs); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp.
583, 583, 585-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) (citing Totten in the decision to deny a discovery
request); Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353, 355 (E.D. Pa.
1912) (citing Totten in the decision to dismiss a suit involving the designs for armorpiercing projectiles).
203
58 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Wash. 1944), aff’d, 153 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1946).
204
Id. at 438.
205
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (2006).
199
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Supreme Court to establish a standard for the state secrets
privilege in the seminal case of United States v. Reynolds.206
The early 1970s saw an increase in the number of
lawsuits in which the government invoked the state secrets
privilege.207 This trend was fueled by several factors. In 1971
the Supreme Court held in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics that private litigants
could seek compensation for the government’s constitutional
violations, which opened the door for numerous types of
lawsuits against the government.208 Further, the Watergate
scandal broke and propelled a massive push for government
accountability, including the fortification of the Freedom of
the
establishment
of
additional
Information
Act,209
congressional oversight mechanisms, and the passage of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.210
As oversight and lawsuits increased, the state secrets
privilege offered a mechanism for the executive branch to both
protect sensitive national security information and avoid
higher levels of transparency and accountability.211 The problem
faced by courts has been determining which of these two
administrative motivations was at play in a given situation,
and to navigate the interbranch tension inherent in a
confrontation with an executive branch assertion of power. The
result has often been that courts decline to get involved in the
process of weighing evidence altogether: in fact, since 1990,
judges have conducted an in camera review of documents over
which the privilege has been claimed in only about twenty
percent of state secrets privilege cases.212
In the post-September 11, 2001 era, the question of
proper invocation of the state secrets privilege resurfaced,
particularly in light of controversial programs such as
warrantless surveillance and extraordinary rendition. Some of
206

345 U.S. 1 (1953).
See Chesney, supra note 51, at 1292-93 (listing several cases during the
1970s in which the state secrets privilege was invoked).
208
See 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (citations omitted).
209
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
210
Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801) (1978).
211
Posting of Bill Weaver to National Security Advisors Blog,
http://natseclaw.typepad.com/natseclaw/2007/05/ok_lets_stop_ta.html (May 16, 2007, 23:04).
212
Id.; see also Ryan Singel, Feds Go All Out to Kill Spy Suit, WIRED.COM,
May 2, 2006, http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2006/05/70785 (quoting
Stephen Aftergood, director of the Project on Government Secrecy, as saying that the
lack of in camera inspections reflects a “judicial lack of self-confidence in the fact of
national security claims made by the executive branch”).
207
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the state secrets cases in the post-September 11 era have
involved government attempts to prevent the disclosure of
technical information related to military issues,213 somewhat
akin to the situation in Reynolds. Other cases involved
government contracting and business management issues,214 or
internal policies and procedures arguably related to national
security.215 Finally, in cases like El-Masri and Al-Haramain, the
privilege was invoked to terminate litigation that involved
allegations of gross violations of individual civil and human
rights.216
III.

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE STATE SECRETS
PRIVILEGE

In establishing the U.S. doctrine of the state secrets
privilege, the Reynolds court relied significantly on the English
precedent of Cammel Laird—and inherent in that decision, an
arguably incorrect reading of Scottish law as well. This Part
evaluates how the Scottish and English versions of the state
secrets privilege, known as public interest immunity, have
evolved since the decision in Reynolds. This analysis provides
context for evaluating the evolution of the U.S. doctrine since
the 1950s, as well as the recent domestic reform efforts. This
Part also examines how countries facing significant national
213

E.g., Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 423 F.3d 1260, 1262-63 (Fed. Cir.
2005); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1006, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(upholding the claim of state secrets privilege); DTM Research, LLC v. AT&T Corp.,
245 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding claim of state secrets privilege and quashing a
subpoena for government’s information on data mining); United States ex rel. Schwartz
v. TRW, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 388, 393-94 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that the government had
not met the technical requirements of the Reynolds standard).
214
E.g., Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 341 (4th Cir. 2005) (upholding claim
of privilege to dismiss a Title VII complaint related to employment discrimination);
Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(upholding claim of privilege to dismiss a complaint related to fraudulent contracting);
see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 11 (2005) (dismissing the complaint based on the
precedent of Totten, not on the state secrets privilege per se).
215
E.g., Tenenbaum v. Simonini, 372 F.3d 776, 777-78 (6th Cir. 2004)
(affirming summary judgment in a case alleging religious discrimination as the
motivation for a counterintelligence operation); Darby v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 74 Fed.
App’x 813, 814 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment in a whistleblower suit);
Trulock v. Lee, 66 Fed. App’x 472, 473-78 (4th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of
complaint in a case alleging defamation during a counterintelligence operation);
Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 82, 84 (D.D.C. 2004)
(quashing, in part, deposition subpoena in whistleblower’s claim regarding security
breaches); Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 67, 81-82 (D.D.C.
2004) (dismissing complaint in whistleblower case).
216
See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1192-93 (9th
Cir. 2007); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532-33 (E.D. Va. 2006).
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security challenges that rely heavily on U.K. precedent—such
as Israel and India—deal with questions of state secrets during
litigation.217
A.

Scotland

In the years after Reynolds was decided, Scottish courts
clarified that Vass—albeit misread by the English court in
Cammel Laird—does not support a broader right by the
Scottish government to invoke the state secrets privilege with
little or no review by the courts.218 The 1956 case of Glasgow v.
Central Land Board noted that for Scotland to follow the
English rule
would be to go far along the roads towards subordinating the Courts of
Justice to the policy of the Executive, and to regulating the extent to which
justice could be done by the limits within which that policy would permit it to
219
be done. This has never been the law of Scotland.

Glasgow was the first case after Cammel Laird and
Reynolds were decided to clarify the differences between
Scottish and English law. In Glasgow, the Law Lords
specifically acknowledged that the rationale of Cammel Laird
did not apply to Scottish cases, as “an inherent power in the
Court of Scotland provides an ultimate safeguard of justice in
that country which is denied to a litigant in England,”220 and
noted that should the Lords have to judge a Scottish appeal
regarding the public interest privilege, they would “be jealous
to preserve [the Scottish rights].”221
This distinction between the Scottish and English
approaches was revisited in Conway v. Rimmer in 1968.222 The
Lords articulated the Scottish standard, that “[i]f, on balance,
considering the likely importance of the document in the case
before it, the court considers that it should probably be
produced, it should generally examine the document before

217

India and Israel provide useful comparative examples because they are
functioning democratic nations with constitutionally mandated separation of powers,
they face serious ongoing national security threats, and, like the United States in the
context of the state secrets privilege, derive some legal processes from the United
Kingdom.
218
E.g., Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] A.C. 910, 960-61 (H.L.).
219
Whitehall v. Whitehall, [1957] S.C. (H.L.) 30, 37 (citing Glasgow v. Cent.
Land Bd., [1956] S.C. (H.L.) 1, 11).
220
Glasgow, [1956] S.C. at 9-10.
221
Id. at 11.
222
Conway, [1968] A.C. 910.
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ordering the production.”223 The court ultimately decided,
despite the government’s affidavit to the contrary, that any
harm from disclosure was minimal, and that the documents in
question should be produced, as they were “vital to the
litigation.”224
The Court did, however, set forth guidelines defining
when greater deference was due to the executive, applicable to
documents concerning the national defense, documents “of a
political nature, such as high state papers,” and departmental
papers involving issues of public interest.225 On the other side of
the balancing test, Crown litigation related to accidents
involving government employees and on government premises
are areas in which “Crown privilege ought not to be claimed . . .
and we propose not to do so in the future.”226 In creating a more
detailed approach to the balancing test, the court openly
acknowledged that “[i]mmunity from unauthorised disclosure
and from accountability are two sides of the same coin,”227 which
informs the Court’s careful and narrow approach to applying
the privilege.
The Conway court also specifically undertook a
dissection of the Cammel Laird228 opinion that conflated the
English and Scottish standards, concluding that the Cammel
Laird court’s determination to uphold the claim of public
interest privilege was correct, but that the muddling of the
Scottish standard was not.229 The Lords ultimately concluded
that:
it is worth remembering that the conclusion [in Cammel Laird] was
reached under a misapprehension as to the corresponding law of
Scotland. The Scottish cases show that although seldom exercised
the residual power of the court to inspect and if necessary order
production of documents is claimed. By a misapprehension, however,
in Duncan’s case the protection in Crown privilege cases in both
countries was held to be absolute. This misapprehension no longer

223

Id. at 911.
Id. at 911, 918. The court noted that there is no case in which the executive
becomes the “final arbiter of the privilege claimed,” since that right is reserved solely
for the court. Id. at 918. The court also reaffirmed its right to examine documents in
camera in order to make its privilege determination. Id.
225
Id. at 920, 937.
226
Conway, [1968] A.C. at 923.
227
Id. at 924.
228
Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624.
229
Conway, [1968] A.C. at 938.
224
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prevails since the decision of this House in Glasgow Corporation v.
Central Land Board.230

The Scottish balancing test enunciated in Conway
continues to be used by courts today and has not been reformed
significantly since.
B.

England

In the years since Cammel Laird was decided, English
courts have continued to afford high levels of deference to
government officials claiming the public interest immunity,
and remained reluctant to conduct in camera inspections of the
documents in dispute. This deference toward the government
has at times troubled the English courts, as graphically
illustrated in the February 2009 decision in the case of Binyam
Mohamed, discussed below.
One example of deference toward government claims for
a public interest immunity certificate is the 1983 case of Air
Canada v. Secretary of State for Trade,231 in which airlines sued
the English government over increased airline taxes at
Heathrow Airport. During the litigation, plaintiffs sought
government documents outlining the reasoning behind the tax
increase.232 The lower court decided to examine the documents
in camera, which led to an interlocutory appeal by the
government.233 The Lords reversed the decision of the lower
court as to in camera review, stating that when a government
official has proffered a good faith affidavit as to the need for the
public interest immunity to apply, the court should give
absolute deference.234
The English courts continue to grant extremely broad
deference to executive decision-making—certainly as broad as
had been afforded in Cammel Laird and that is applied by U.S.
courts. English courts often address the invocation of the
privilege after initial pleadings have been filed; courts have the
option of examining the documents in camera but rarely do so.
More commonly, courts uphold a public interest immunity
certificate (akin to U.S. courts upholding the claim of privilege)
with regard to the evidence in question and allow the plaintiff
230
231
232
233
234

Id. at 977.
(1983) 2 A.C. 394 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
Id. at 394.
Id. at 395.
Id.
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to continue its case if possible without the benefit of the
evidence in question.
However, the ongoing U.K. case of Binyam Mohamed
highlights the complexities of such deference to the executive
branch, and how political and foreign policy considerations can
undermine government accountability for alleged human rights
abuses.
Binyam Mohamed is a British resident who traveled to
Afghanistan in 2001.235 According to Mohamed, he traveled to
escape a lifestyle that led to drug addiction in England.236
According to U.S. authorities, Mohamed trained with the
Taliban in Afghanistan to prepare for an attack within the
United States.237 Mohamed was arrested in Pakistan in 2002 as
he attempted to return to the U.K.; he claims that he was then
detained and tortured in Pakistan, and then transported to
Morocco, where he was held incommunicado and tortured
repeatedly during the following eighteen months.238 Mohamed
alleges that he was then held in Afghanistan for some time,
and was ultimately transferred to the U.S. detention center at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he was held from September
2004239 until February 2009.240
Mohamed and others alleging they were subjected to
extraordinary rendition by the United States filed suit in
California in 2007 against the company that operated the
airplanes which transported the detainees to various detention
centers around the world.241 In May 2008, the United States
charged Mohamed under the Military Commissions Act242 with

235

Profile:
Binyam
Mohamed,
BBCNEWS.COM,
Feb.
23,
2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7870387.stm.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id. Mohamed alleges that he was beaten, scalded and cut with a scalpel by
his captors. See id.
239
Id.
240
Raymond Bonner, Detainee Who Claims Abuse to Return to Britain, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at A5.
241
Amended Complaint at 1-6, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d
992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-2798).
242
10 U.S.C. §§ 948-950 (2006).
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conspiracy to commit terrorism,243 relying on confessions which
Mohamed alleged were elicited under the threat of torture.244
Mohamed’s attorneys began separate proceedings in
English courts seeking release of evidence in the possession of
the British government that the United States had compiled
against Mohamed.245 In August 2008, a court ruled in
Mohamed’s favor, concluding that Mohamed’s allegations of
torture were substantiated and Mohamed had a right to such
evidence that supported his claim. As part of its ruling, the
court summarized evidence gleaned from U.S. intelligence
sources, but redacted that summary after the Foreign
Secretary issued a public interest immunity certificate
claiming that state secrets were at issue in Mohamed’s suit.246
The Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division
reconsidered in early 2009 whether the public interest
immunity certificate issued by the Foreign Secretary was
compelling such that the previously redacted summary with
evidence of Mohamed’s treatment could not be given to
Mohamed’s attorneys.247 The public interest immunity
certificate asserted that the summary report must remain
undisclosed because the U.S government had threatened to “reevaluate its intelligence sharing relationship with the United
243

This proceeding was later dropped, as the convening judge determined the
prosecution could not proceed without the use of evidence obtained through torture. See
William Glaberson, U.S. Drops Charges for 5 Guantanamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
21, 2008, at A1.
244
Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2008]
EWHC (Admin) 2048, [38]-[47] (Eng.).
245
Profile: Binyam Mohamed, supra note 235. In May 2007, Mohamed and
several other plaintiffs brought suit against the Boeing subsidiary that allegedly
organized the “torture flights” of detainees subjected to extraordinary rendition,
alleging the company’s complicity in torture and other human rights abuses. See
Amended Complaint, supra note 241, at 4-6. That suit was initially dismissed based on
the George W. Bush administration’s assertion of the state secrets privilege. Mohamed
v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134-1136 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (relying
on Al-Haramain and El-Masri). The plaintiffs appealed this judgment to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which heard argument on the matter in February 2009.
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended and
superseded by 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009). At that point, representatives of the Obama
administration reiterated the Bush administration argument that the suit was
properly dismissed based on the invocation of the state secrets privilege. See John
Schwartz, Obama Backs Off a Reversal on Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009.
246
Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2008]
EWHC (Admin) 2048, [150]-[160] (Eng.).
247
The court noted that the information in question was “seven very short
paragraphs amounting to about 25 lines” of text which summarized reports by the
United States Government to British intelligence services on the treatment of
Mohamed during his detention in Pakistan. See Mohamed v. Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [14] (Eng.).
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Kingdom” and possibly withhold vital national security
information from the United Kingdom should the summary be
disclosed to Mohamed’s attorneys.248
The English court laid out the test for balancing the
public interest in national security and the public interest in
“open justice, the rule of law and democratic accountability.”249
The test involved balancing the public interest in disclosure of
the information and the possibility of serious harm to a public
interest such as national security if disclosure is made, and
determining whether national security interests can be
protected by means other than nondisclosure.250
The English court took pains to detail all of the reasons
that disclosure was desirable, including upholding the rule of
law,251 comporting with international and supranational
standards,252 ensuring that allegations of serious criminality are
not dismissed inappropriately,253 maintaining accountability
over the executive branch of government,254 and protecting the
public and media interest in disclosure of government
activities.255 The court also appeared surprised that the United
States government was apparently interfering in a matter of
government accountability in another country.256
In applying the test, the court relied heavily on its longstanding precedent of offering deference to the executive
248

Id. [62].
Id. [18] (noting that this case revolved around a question of the rule of law,
not around the rights of an individual litigant).
250
Id. [34] (citing R v. H, [2004] 2 A.C. 134, [38(3)]).
251
Id. [18], [19].
252
See Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [20], [21], [26], [101]-[105].
253
Id. [25(iv)], [25(ix)].
254
Id. [32].
255
Id. [37] (“Where there is no publicity there is no justice . . . . There is no
greater danger of usurpation than that which proceeds little by little, under cover of
rules of procedure, and at the instance of judges themselves.”).
256
Id. [67]-[72]. The court noted:
249

[I]n light of the long history of the common law and democracy which we
share with the United States, it was, in our view difficult to conceive that a
democratically elected and accountable government could possibly have had
any rational objection to placing into the public domain such a summary of
what its own officials reported as to how a detainee was treated by them and
which made no disclosure of sensitive intelligence matters. Indeed we did not
consider that a democracy governed by the rule of law would expect a court in
another democracy to suppress a summary of the evidence . . . where the
evidence was relevant to allegations of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, politically embarrassing though it might be.
Id. at [69].
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branch in matters of national security.257 The court found that
the Foreign Secretary acted in good faith in issuing the public
interest immunity certificate;258 that an opportunity for
government accountability may still exist with ongoing
investigations within the U.K. into Mohamed’s allegations;259
and that the position of the U.S. government had not changed
with the change of presidential administrations.260 The court
then decided that there was no basis on which it could question
the Foreign Secretary’s issuance of the public interest
immunity certificate.261
In an extremely unusual move, the court re-opened its
ruling on public interest immunity and in October 2009
reversed its previous decision to withhold the information
regarding Mohamed’s treatment by the U.S. government.262 The
court reasoned that there was an extremely low likelihood that
the Obama administration would actually withhold important
intelligence from the U.K. government,263 and noted that “a
vital public interest requires, for reasons of democratic
accountability and the rule of law in the United Kingdom, that
a summary of the most important evidence relating to the
British security services in wrongdoing be placed in the public
domain in the United Kingdom.”264
The series of U.K. court decisions in the Mohamed case
reflects both the strength of English precedent that mandates a
257

See Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [63]-[67]. However, the court
noted that such deference needed to be limited to instances of genuine national
security, and not cases in which “it appears that while disclosure of the material may
cause embarrassment or arouse criticism, it will not damage any security or
intelligence interest.” Id. [66].
258
Id. [62]-[63], [76]-[79] (noting that the Foreign Secretary perceived the U.S.
threat to be real, and that if the threat were carried out, that U.K. national security
interests would be seriously prejudiced). See Ministers Face Torture Pressure,
BBCNEWS.COM, Feb. 4, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7870049.stm
(noting that Foreign Secretary David Milibrand denied that the U.S. made a threat;
Milibrand instead stated that the U.S.-U.K. security relationship was based on trust
and the trust depended on intelligence remaining confidential).
259
Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [102], [104], [105].
260
Id. [78].
261
Id. [79].
262
Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2009]
EWHC 2549, [7] (Admin) (Eng.), Case No. CQ/4241/2008, Oct. 16, 2009 (noting that
reopening of a case should be done in “exceptional circumstances” if necessary in the
“interest of justice”).
263
Id. at [39], [49], [69vi], [104]. The court noted that the objections made by
the Obama administration to disclosing the information in question were not as strong
as the threats made by the Bush administration. Id.
264
Id. at [105].
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high level of deference to the government in matters related to
public interest immunity, and the difficulties that courts may
have in applying that deferential standard when doing so
implicates the rule of law, individual rights and government
accountability in matters of serious allegations of human rights
abuses. The U.K. court in the Mohamed decision weighed the
balance and ultimately based its decision on the need to
maintain the rule of law and to allow for some public
accountability for whatever role the U.K government had in
maltreating Mohamed.265
The latest Mohamed opinion is also evidence of the fact
that although the English and U.S standards on state secrets
are in some ways very similar, the expansion of the use of the
state secrets privilege by the Bush administration—and
supported to some extent by the Obama administration—
reflects a significantly broader privilege being invoked and
granted in the United States. While U.S. administrations may
demand broad grants of immunity for bad acts and high levels
of secrecy in the litigation context, peer nations attempting to
limit their application of similar privileges are being put in a
difficult position by the U.S. government.266
C.

Israel

Israel does not apply a standardized doctrine
comparable to the U.S. state secrets privilege or the Scottish
and English public interest immunity. Instead, the analysis of
a state secrets-type claim turns on two questions: whether the
case is justiciable, and then, assuming the case survives that
analysis, how to evaluate potentially sensitive evidence that
relates to national security matters.
Unlike the non-justiciability doctrine of Totten, in Israel
almost any complaint against the executive branch and its

265

Id. The court continues to withhold the seven paragraphs of information at
issue pending an appeal by the U.K. government. See John F. Burns, Britain: High
Court Approves Releasing U.S. Intelligence Documents on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2009, at A5.
266
See Defendant’s Open Submissions at 6-9, Mohamed v. Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Claim No. CQ/4241/2008, (EWHC (Admin)
May 11, 2009) (attaching a May 6, 2009 letter from the Obama administration
reiterating its position that disclosure of information in question—even if made
unilaterally by English courts over the objection of Her Majesty’s Government—would
likely lead to the withholding of valuable counterterrorism information from the
United Kingdom).
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actions is considered justiciable.267 The Israeli Supreme Court
dismantled various doctrinal barriers to judicial review in the
1990s, such as standing and justiciability, in order to facilitate
more private actions.268 Even with an extremely broad grant of
standing—particularly by U.S. standards—Israeli courts
undertake a balancing analysis to determine whether national
security-related litigation ought to continue or be dismissed as
non-justiciable.269 This is particularly remarkable given the
difficult national security situation Israel faces.270
In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel,271
the central issue was whether preventative strikes undertaken
by the Israeli military in response to alleged terrorist attacks
were illegal.272 The plaintiffs challenged the practices of the
military based on the loss of civilian life in the strikes and
Israel’s obligations under international treaties and
international customary law.273 However, before reaching a
conclusion as to the merits of the case, the court considered a
challenge by the Government that the suit was not justiciable,
based largely on national security grounds.274
267

Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme
Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 153 (2002).
268
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British
and Israeli Experiences, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1906, 1923 (2004). Schulhofer also notes
that Israeli government and military leaders seem to accept the judicial safeguards
that have been put into place to modify the conduct of the administration. Id. at 1931.
269
In this regard, the justiciability analysis of Israeli courts can be likened to
Totten and other state secrets privilege cases which have been dismissed at the
pleadings stage, for example, El-Masri, based on the supposed centrality of the
protected material to the claims brought in the lawsuit.
270
See, e.g., Public Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 2005 Isr. HCJ
769/02. 10, 16, 47; Public Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 1999 Isr. HCJ
5100/94, ¶ 1 (“The State of Israel has been engaged in an unceasing struggle for both
its very existence and security, from the day of its founding.”); Schulhofer, supra note
268, at 1919 (describing the security risks faced by Israel since its founding).
271
Public Comm. Against Torture, HCJ 769/02.
272
Id. ¶¶ 1-3.
273
Id. ¶¶ 3-6.
274
Id. ¶ 9 (the government, in arguing against justiciability, cited Israeli High
Court of Justice precedent, HCJ 5872/01 Barakeh v. Prime Minister [2002] IsrSC 56(3)
1, for the proposition that “the choice of means of war employed by [the government] in
order to prevent murderous terrorist attacks before they happen, is not among the
subjects in which this Court will see fit to intervene”). In this respect, the Public
Committee Against Torture case is analogous to the question faced by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Totten. Although the U.S. Supreme Court in Tenet specified that Totten was
not strictly a state secrets case, the analysis of the justiciability element—given the
recent trend in the U.S. of claiming the state secrets privilege at the pleadings stage
and dismissing suits accordingly, see, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 373
(2007)—is relevant as part of a larger analysis of state invocation of national security
to curtail litigation.
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The Israeli Supreme Court considered the broad Israeli
justiciability doctrine, and assessed both the government’s
claim of normative non-justiciability—where a court could find
it cannot try a case because it lacks any relevant legal standard
to apply275—and institutional non-justiciability—where a court
has a relevant legal standard to apply, but chooses not to try
the case due to structural factors, such as confronting an issue
solely within the purview of a different branch of government.276
In Public Committee Against Torture, the court rejected
the notion of normative non-justiciability—that the matter
does not fall within the realm of law—but applied a fourpronged standard to analyze the question of institutional
justiciability—determining whether the courts are the
appropriate institution to deal with an issue: (1) a case that
involves the impingement of human rights is always
justiciable;277 (2) a case in which the central issue is one of
political or military policy and not a legal dispute is not
justiciable under the institutional justiciability doctrine;278 (3)
an issue that has already been decided by international courts
and tribunals to which Israel is a signatory must be justiciable
in Israel’s domestic courts as well;279 and (4) judicial review is
most appropriate in an ex post situation, where the court is
evaluating particular applications of a government policy,
rather than the policy itself.280
If the first and second prongs of the institutional
justiciability analysis come into conflict in a particular
situation, courts must undertake a proportionality analysis.281
Applying these criteria to the situation at hand, the Court
found that the claims were deeply entwined with alleged
human rights violations;282 that the suit did not implicate
political or military policies per se, since the suit did not
question the practice of targeted strikes generally, so much as
275

Public Comm. Against Torture, HCJ 769/02, ¶ 48.
Id. ¶ 49.
277
Id. ¶ 50 (citing HCJ 606/78 Oyeb v. Minister of Def., 33(2) IsrSC 113, 124).
278
Id. ¶ 51 (citing HCJ 4481/91 Bargil v. Israel 37(4) IsrSC 210, 218).
279
Id. ¶ 53.
280
Id. ¶ 54.
281
Id. ¶ 58 (“Between these two ends of the spectrum, there are intermediate
situations. Each of them requires a meticulous examination of the character of the
decision. To the extent that it has a legal aspect, it approaches the one end of the
spectrum. To the extent that it has a professional military aspect, it approaches the
other end of the spectrum.”).
282
Id. ¶¶ 1-3.
276
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the effect of the specific military strikes on individual
civilians;283 that international courts and tribunals had already
opined on this issue;284 and that this was the type of ex post
situation that was most appropriate for judicial review, despite
the sensitive nature of the claims.285
Following the court’s rejection of the government’s claim
of non-justiciability,286 the court determined that targeted
killings are not, per se, illegal under customary international
law, and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.287 The
Israeli Supreme Court has consistently found that executive
branch national security policy is judicially reviewable, has
rejected the idea that only the executive branch can adequately
evaluate a national security-related issue,288 and has expressed
none of the concern voiced by the Bush administration over
judicial involvement in the decision to disclose security-related
documents.289
Indeed, the Israeli courts have consistently been
involved in weighing national security interests against human
rights concerns, and have developed a sophisticated analysis to
do so. In Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in
Israel v. Minister of the Interior, Justice Procaccia explained
the balancing act that Israeli courts undertake:
The “security need” argument made by the state has no magical
power such that once raised it must be accepted without inquiry and
investigation . . . . Admittedly, as a rule, the court is cautious in
examining the security considerations of the authorities and it does
not intervene in them lightly. Notwithstanding, where the
implementation of a security policy involves a violation of human
rights, the court should examine the reasonableness of the

283

Id. ¶¶ 8, 51.
Id. ¶¶ 19-46, 56 (discussing the application of international customary law).
285
Id. ¶ 54.
286
The institutional non-justiciability argument has been successful in other
cases. See Bargil v. Israel, 1993 Isr. HCJ 4481/91 (finding executive branch policies
governing Israeli settlements to be non-justiciable).
287
Public Comm. Against Torture, HCJ 769/02, ¶ 63. The court did not
mention, however, how it would deal with evidentiary issues involving national
security secrets that may arise as an individual instance of a targeted killing was
litigated.
288
See, e.g., Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor, 1989 Isr. HCJ 680/88. This
case also reflects how many of the state secrets cases in Israel relate to alleged
violations of the Official Secrets Act. See id. at ¶¶ 3-7.
289
See Mukasey Letter, supra note 103.
284
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considerations of the authorities and the proportionality of the
measures that they wish to implement.290

Additionally, Israeli courts do not hesitate to use in
camera review to assess whether a purported national security
risk is real. For example, in Vanunu v. Head of the Home Front
Command,291 a case involving a violation of the Official Secrets
Act, the court undertook extensive in camera review without
the presence of parties or counsel in order to determine
whether the information in question, if disclosed, would pose a
risk to national security.292 The Court ultimately agreed with
the government’s position that the information needed to
remain undisclosed. Likewise, in Adalah, the Court found no
issue with the trial court reviewing privileged material ex
parte in order to determine whether the government’s claim of
military necessity in connection with contested national
security policies was supportable.293
It is noteworthy that in camera and ex parte review of
materials in any of these Israeli cases is neither unusual nor
subject to objection by either party. These decisions represent
an engagement by the Israeli judiciary in the various national
security operations utilized by Israel’s military294 and
demonstrate the importance accorded to rule-of-law issues in
the court’s analysis.295
290

Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Isr. v. Minister of
Interior, 2006 Isr. HCJ 7052/03 443, 692-93 (citing Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the
West Bank [1], at 375-76; Livnat v. Chairman of Constitution, Law and Justice Comm.,
HCJ 9070/00, 810).
291
2004 Isr. HCJ 5211/04.
292
Id.
293
Adalah, HCJ 7052/03, ¶¶ 10-12 (opinion of A. Procaccia, J.) (explaining the
two-step balancing test undertaken to determine military necessity).
294
See Public Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel, 1999 Isr. HCJ 5100/94,
¶¶ 38-40 (finding that the Israeli military’s use of physical interrogation techniques on
Palestinian detainees was not legally protected activity); Hallett, supra note 38; see
also Deborah Sontag, Israel Court Bans Most Use of Force in Interrogations, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 1999, at A1.
295
See, e.g., Public Comm. Against Torture, HCJ. 5100/94, ¶¶ 38-40. The court
struggled with several national priorities:
[W]e are aware that this decision does not ease dealing with that harsh
reality of Israel’s security issues. This is the destiny of democracy, as not all
means are acceptable to it, and not all practices employed by its enemies are
open before it. Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied
behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserving the Rule of
Law and recognition of an individual’s liberty constitutes an important
component in its understanding of security.
Id. ¶ 39.
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India

India, like Israel, does not operate under a standardized
state secrets doctrine. However, India’s approach to requests
for document disclosure and the need for secrecy is markedly
different from that of Israel. Indian courts afford an extremely
high level of deference to executive branch claims of the need
for confidentiality and secrecy, and although courts undertake
a balancing test to determine whether the public interest or
individual rights at stake should override executive secrecy,
the claim for secrecy consistently prevails.296
Deference to executive branch decision-making is deeprooted, despite the passage of freedom of information statutes297
and acknowledgement by the Indian Supreme Court that
freedom of information is a positive right recognized in Article
19 of the Indian Constitution.298
This deference in the litigation context is consistent
with India’s history of granting the executive branch sole power
to determine whether to disclose information in any number of
contexts, and applying strict and often harsh enforcement of its
Official Secrets Act, a legacy of British colonial rule in India.299
296

E.g., People’s Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.,
(1998) 1 S.C.C. 301 (upholding denial of request for disclosure of information).
297
E.g., Freedom of Information Act, No. 5 of 2003; India Code (2009),
available at http://indiacode.nic.in/; see Richard N. Winfield & Sherrell Evans, Not
Good Enough: India’s Freedom of Information Bill Has Great Potential to Overhaul the
Ills of Secrecy and Inaccessibility but There Are Inadequacies that Need to be
Addressed, 11 NO. 1 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 24, 25 (2003).
298
S.P. Gupta v. President of India A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 234 (“The concept of an
open Government is the direct emanation from the right to know which seems implicit
in the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(a). Therefore,
disclosures of information in regard to the functioning of Government must be the rule,
and secrecy an exception justified only where the strictest requirements of public
interest so demands.”).
299
India operates under the edicts of the Official Secrets Act of 1923 (OSA),
enforced in India by the British colonial government. See Winfield & Evans, supra note
297, at 25. Under the OSA, any disclosure of information—intentional or inadvertent—
likely to affect the sovereignty, integrity or security of India is punishable by
imprisonment for up to fourteen years. Although similar provisions of the Official
Secrets Act were removed in England in 1989, the provisions of the 1923 Act remain in
effect in India, despite criticism of its application. See Sarbari Sinha, Official Secrets
and a Frame-Up, FRONTLINE, May 7, 2005, available at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/
fl2210/stories/20050520000607400.htm (addressing how revocation of the Official
Secrets Act would curb potential abuses of police powers).
One of the most prominent examples of an OSA-related arrest and
detention is the case of Iftikar Gilani, a Kashmiri journalist detained by the Indian
government for seven months in 2002 and 2003 for an alleged violation of the Official
Secrets Act. See A. Deepa, Presumed Guilty, Secretly, INDIA TOGETHER, July 14, 2005,
available at http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/jul/rvw-gilani.htm. Gilani was arrested
and charged with sedition under Sections 3 and 9 of the Official Secrets Act for
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Several right-to-information cases are helpful in
understanding the level of deference accorded to executive
branch assertions of nondisclosure. S.P. Gupta v. Union of
India was an early articulation of the view that disclosure of
information related to government activities ought to be the
norm, and that nondisclosure should be sanctioned only after a
balancing test in which the court weighed disclosure against a
government claim of public interest immunity.300
However, courts have continued to apply the balancing
test from Gupta by giving the utmost deference to an executive
branch claim for nondisclosure in the name of public interest.
In Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India,301 the Indian Supreme
Court considered whether to order the publication of
background documents underlying the Vohra Committee
Report, a government compilation of information related to
corruption in all branches and levels of government. Members
of Parliament, including petitioner Dinesh Trivedi, alleged that
the Home Minister refused to disclose evidence about
government corruption, not as a matter of public interest, but
as a means to avoid government embarrassment.302 The
government offered an affidavit from the Home Secretary in
response, affirming that a summary report that had been made
available to Parliament was accurate, but that additional
documents could not be disclosed as a matter of public
interest.303
The court reiterated the test set forth in Gupta, noting,
“Sunlight is the best disinfectant. But it is equally important to
be alive to the dangers that lie ahead.”304 The Court relied
heavily on the government assertion that publication of the
report may be injurious to the public interest, and further
hypothesized that the public furor toward individuals named in
the report—should it be published in full—could lead to
harassment and violence.305 The court, therefore, held that
possessing a document that was generated in Pakistan and was publicly available in
India—clearly not an official secret of the Indian government—and was imprisoned
under harrowing conditions. Gilani was never tried in court, and was released after
contradictions in the government’s case were made public. See generally IFTIKAR
GILANI, MY DAYS IN PRISON (2005) (detailing the arrest and detention experience of
Gilani).
300
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1982) 87 S.C.C. Supp. ¶¶ 73-74.
301
Shri Dinesh Trivedi, M.P. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1997) 4 S.C.C. 306.
302
Id. ¶ 6.
303
Id. ¶¶ 9-10.
304
Id. ¶ 14.
305
Id. ¶ 16.
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publication of the full report and its underlying documents was
unnecessary.306
In 2004, the Indian Supreme Court synthesized much of
the reasoning from its earlier right to information cases in
deciding the secrecy case of People’s Union for Civil Liberties v.
Union of India.307 Here, the court evaluated whether a
government report on a nationwide nuclear reactor program308
must be disclosed in response to a request by various citizens’
rights groups alleging concerns about the safety of the reactors,
and over the objection of the government. The Atomic Energy
Act of 1962 governed the submission and maintenance of the
report, and contained specific provisions for the government to
withhold such reports from public dissemination due to a
concern that disclosure “would cause irreparable injury to the
interest of the State [and] also would be prejudicial to the
national security.”309 In this regard, the government’s argument
in favor of secrecy was bolstered by the statutory language
authorizing nondisclosure.310
The citizens’ rights groups offered extensive evidence
that details of the report—and specific discussion of the safety
concerns therein—had been made public years before through
press releases and media interviews.311 Petitioners further
argued that the public interest of the citizenry to understand
the potential safety risks of the nationwide nuclear reactor
program outweighed the purported threat to national security
that would arise from disclosure.312
The court acknowledged the fundamental right to
information as set forth in Article 19(1) India’s constitution.313
The court also noted that the general rule of disclosure is
necessary to “ensure the continued participation of the people

306

Id. ¶¶ 16-20.
See People’s Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.
(1998) 1 S.C.C. 301.
308
The specific report in question was a November 1995 report by the Atomic
Energy Regulatory Board (A.E.R.B.) documenting safety defects and weaknesses in the
nuclear reactor system. See id. at Writ Proceedings section.
309
See id. (referring to the purpose of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962).
310
See id. at Vires of Section 18 of the Act section (noting that Parliament had
sanctioned the designation of documents as secret according to the criteria of Section
18 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962).
311
See id. at Writ Proceedings section.
312
See id.
313
Id. at High Court Judgment section; see also INDIA CONST. art. 19, § 1.
307
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in the democratic process” and that “[s]unlight is the best
disinfectant” against government overreaching.314
However, the court reasoned, the Constitution’s
protection for the right to information was limited: “Unlike
Constitutions of some other developed countries, however, no
fundamental right in India is absolute in nature. Reasonable
restrictions can be imposed on such fundamental rights.”315 The
court noted that Article 19(2) of the Constitution gave the
government the privilege of withholding information in the
public interest, and reasoned that secrecy was sometimes
necessary because “[i]f every action taken by the political or
executive functionary is transformed into a public controversy
and made subject to an enquiry to soothe popular sentiments,
it will undoubtedly have a chilling effect on the independence
of the decision-maker.”316
The Court also examined India’s Evidence Act, which
set forth the standard for evidentiary privilege.317 Section 123 of
the Evidence Act provides an extremely deferential standard
for government documents: “No one shall be permitted to give
any evidence derived from unpublished official records relating
to any affairs of State, except with the permission of the officer
at the head of the department concerned, who shall give or
withhold such permission as he thinks fit.”318 If a lawsuit is
brought in which disclosure of a previously undisclosed
document is sought, Section 162 of the Evidence Act allows the
court to inspect the document, “unless it refers to matters of
State.”319 The Court found this standard to be consistent with
the English cases on public interest immunity.320
The Attorney General volunteered to submit the
government report to the Court for an in camera review, but
314

People’s Union for Civil Liberties, 1 S.C.C. at Right of Information section.
State Can Withhold Information on Vital Issues: SC, TRIBUNE
(Chandigarh, India), Jan. 11, 2004, available at http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/
20040112/nation.htm#1.
316
People’s Union for Civil Liberties, 1 S.C.C. at Right of Information section.
317
See id. at Criteria for Determining the Question of Privilege section.
318
The Indian Evidence Act, No. 1 of 1872; India Code (2009), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/. (ch. IX, § 123, Evidence as to Affairs of State).
319
Id. (Ch. IX., Sec. 162, Production of Documents).
320
People’s Union for Civil Liberties, 1 S.C.C. at Criteria for Determining the
Question of Privilege section (citing State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975
S.C. 865, which held that “the foundation of the law behind Sections 123 and 162 of the
Evidence Act is the same as in English Law. It is that injury to public interest is the
reason for the exclusion from disclosure of documents whose contents if disclosed would
injure public and national interest”).
315
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the Court declined, stating that there were no grounds to
examine the report itself.321 Instead, the government proffered
affidavits attesting to the need to maintain secrecy for national
security reasons, and to the fact that the Atomic Energy Act of
1962 made specific provisions allowing the government to
object to disclosure.322 The Court relied on the government
affidavits regarding potential threats to national security to
support its decision to deny the petitioner’s claim.323 The
holding of the case affirmed the strong protection for the
government’s unilateral decision to withhold information in the
litigation context, should questions of international relations,
national security,324 or other deliberative information be at
issue. This protection remains robust despite language from
the courts that suggests that disclosure, not government
secrecy, ought to be the norm.325
The Court decided People’s Union for Civil Liberties in
2004, and one year later the Right to Information Act, 2005
(“RTI”) was enacted by the Indian parliament. The RTI was
breakthrough legislation in attempting to shed light on
governmental practices. The passage of the RTI occurred after
sustained efforts by various groups to incorporate strong and
enforceable FOIA-type provisions into Indian law.326
However, the changes envisioned in the passage of the
RTI have not yet materialized. First, the backlog in the
processing of RTI claims since 2005 appears to have
immediately overwhelmed state and national information
officers charged with responding to RTI requests, bringing the
RTI request process to a near standstill.327 These delays are
321

See id. at Conclusion.
See id. at Writ Proceedings section.
323
See id. at A.E.R.B. Report section, Conclusion (in which the Court noted
that the Attorney General had offered to submit the A.E.R.B. Report to the Court for
an in camera review, but that the Court saw no need to examine the report itself).
324
Although petitioners claimed that the 1995 report did not implicate
matters of national security, the Court disagreed on the grounds that nuclear material
was inherently volatile. See id. at High Court Judgment section.
325
E.g., D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 S.C.C. 216,
(“Transparency of action and accountability perhaps are [the two] safeguards which
this court must insist upon.”).
326
The RTI replaced the Freedom of Information Act, which was perceived to
be too weak in mandating government disclosure. See The Right to Information Act,
No, 22 of 2005, India Code (2009), available at http://indiacode.nic.in/.
327
See Anita Aikara, Information Delayed is Information Denied, DAILY NEWS
& ANALYSIS, Sept. 7, 2008, http://www.dnaindia.com/dnaprint.asp?newsid=1188257
(noting that over 15,000 RTI cases were waiting to be processed at the State
Information Commission level in one state, Maharashtra); RTI Activists Ask for Fast
322
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compounded with the backlog of years and sometimes decades
in the actual litigation of a suit,328 making it difficult to assess
the full impact of the RTI in terms of genuine changes to the
Indian judiciary’s approach to sensitive government
information.
Second, the RTI loophole for excluding disclosure of
national security policy is extremely broad and may be used by
the executive branch to revert to its usual posture of avoiding
disclosure of information that has only an attenuated
connection to national security issues.329 From the few RTI
claims that have been adjudicated within the information
commission system, it appears that information commissioners
are viewing the national security exception to RTI as a broad
mandate for nondisclosure.330
IV.

VIEWING U.S. REFORM EFFORTS WITHIN A COMPARATIVE
CONTEXT

Although the current U.S. use and application of the
state secrets privilege is roughly analogous to that of England,
the Mohamed case suggests that England’s current application

Case Disposal, DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS, Aug. 23, 2008, http://www.dnaindia.com/
dnaprint.asp?newsid=1185178 (noting that the estimated time for an RTI claim to be
processed in Maharashtra was 18 to 24 months).
328
A recent report to Parliament by the Indian Law Minister noted that the
Indian Supreme Court currently has a backlog of 48,000 cases waiting to be heard. See
48,000 Pending Cases in SC; 38 Lakh in HCs: Bhardwaj, ZEENEWS.COM, Oct. 20, 2008,
http://www.zeenews.com/Nation/2008-10-20/477538news.html.
329
Historically, Indian courts have granted the utmost deference to the
executive branch as to when national security policy should be disclosed. E.g., State of
Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 865 (carving out national security as the
area in which the Prime Minister can unilaterally decide what information to disclose).
330
In one case, the Central Information Commission upheld the denial of an
RTI request for information by environmental activists regarding the cost of processing
nuclear fuel at a nuclear reactor then under construction. The Commission reasoned
that nuclear material reprocessing was a component of the recent India-U.S. nuclear
agreement, and therefore was central to the strategic and scientific interests of India.
Although the costs associated with processing were not necessarily sensitive
information, the Commission found that the “disclosure of this information can have
unforeseen ramifications because of the sensitivity in the nature of the project on which
the information is sought.” Right to Information Act of 2005—Sec. 19 Appeal No.
CIC/WB/A/2006/00878 at 5, Central Information Commission, Nov. 29, 2006 (decided
Sept. 10, 2007), available at http://cic.gov.in/CIC-Orders/Decision_10092007_08.pdf.
In another case, a state information commission relied on the national
security exception to refuse an RTI claim seeking a memorandum of understanding
between the government and Dow Chemical Corporation to build a research and
development facility. See Rajshri Mehta, Govt Rejects RTI Plea on MoU with Dow,
DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS, Apr. 15, 2008, http://www.dnaindia.com/dnaprint.asp?
newsid=1159813.
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of the privilege may be more narrow than that of the United
States, and that the English court in Mohamed considered
expanding the scope of its own public interest immunity under
threat of national security repercussions from the United
States. The transnational implications of U.S. pressure
regarding the state secrets privilege may be that even if other
nations’ courts use a narrower standard for the privilege, those
standards may be undermined if the U.S. government uses its
considerable clout to pressure governments to claim state
secrets in cases where U.S. government actions are implicated.
U.S. courts are also less deferential to the executive
branch than India, but much more so than Scotland and Israel.
The proposed congressional reforms offer some positive steps to
establish procedural safeguards that strike an appropriate
balance between national security interests and the rule of law,
government accountability, and individual liberty. However,
Congress should consider going further in addressing the need
for litigation to compensate those who have suffered gross
constitutional and human rights violations at the hands of the
government.
A.

Future Reform Efforts Should Consider Explicitly
Accounting for Alleged Human Rights Abuses

If the legislative reforms are adopted, the United States’
application of the state secrets privilege would align with the
Scottish courts’ treatment of public interest immunity.
However, the reforms proffered in the United States fall short
of the Israeli standard of justiciability in national security
matters—the Israeli standard explicitly requires consideration
of allegations of human rights abuses, whereas the proposed
safeguards in the United States do not.331
Of course, the Israeli test for justiciability is not directly
analogous to the United States doctrine regarding the state
secrets privilege. However, reforms in the United States should
require courts to consider potential human rights abuses in
determining whether a lawsuit should go forward, particularly
with regard to whether a case ought to be ultimately
dismissed.332 Although the nature of the allegations should not
331

See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2008); State Secrets
Protection Act, H.R. 5607, 110th Cong. (2008).
332
Under S. 2533, such a dismissal could not occur until the discovery phase
has at least begun. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2008).
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be determinative as to whether litigation should proceed, it
would be appropriate for U.S. judges—like their Israeli
counterparts—to undertake a balancing test which accounts for
the nature of the claim when deciding whether a case ought to
go forward at the discovery stage. After all, the cases of ElMasri, Al-Haramain, and Mohamed, and the violations of
human rights and constitutional safeguards that they
represent, are at the heart of the impetus for reforming the
privilege.
B.

Congressional Reforms Should Encompass Both the
State Secrets Privilege and Justiciability

Congress should consider proposing reforms that
encompass both the evidentiary issues of the state secrets
privilege and the justiciability questions surrounding Totten
and its progeny. Although the Supreme Court clarified in Tenet
v. Doe that questions of justiciability should be considered
independently of the state secrets privilege,333 courts have
struggled with this distinction.334 It would be appropriate and
useful for Congress to assist in the clarification between the
state secrets privilege and Totten’s standard of dismissal based
on the subject matter of the litigation.
Such clarification should be undertaken simultaneously
with state secrets reform because it would close a potential
avenue for the executive branch to avoid disclosure of evidence.
The post-Watergate era saw a spike in invocations of the state
secret privilege precisely because reform efforts had opened
avenues for individual litigants to seek redress and information
from the government.335 A partial reform effort which addresses
the state secrets privilege but not the question of justiciability
may inadvertently provide an incentive to the executive branch
to attempt to dismiss cases based on Totten’s non-justiciability
standard. Congressional reform efforts should include a
justiciability assessment by which courts dismiss cases that fall
squarely within the ambit of Totten (involving secret deals
related to national security and espionage), but should make

333

Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2005).
Id. at 11. For example, even the Third Circuit decision in Reynolds
conflated Totten with aspects of the state secrets privilege. See Reynolds v. United
States, 192 F.2d 987, 996 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Chesney, supra note
47, at 1284-85 (arguing that Totten be considered part of state secrets jurisprudence).
335
See supra Part II.
334

2009]

LITIGATING SECRETS

257

clear that all other cases should be evaluated under the state
secrets privilege, with an additional criterion of accounting for
allegations of human rights abuses. Such a measure would
preclude subsequent abuse of the Totten doctrine as an
alternative means for the executive branch to avoid liability or
disclosure of allegedly sensitive information.
C.

Reforming the Privilege Should Remain a Priority

The national security programs created or enhanced
since 2001 as part of the “war on terror” have come under a
great deal of scrutiny, but very few concrete oversight
measures have taken hold for a number of reasons.
Legislative inertia and a high level of deference to
executive branch decision-making have hobbled many avenues
for genuine legislative oversight or any kind of substantial
reform efforts with regard to national security and the rule of
law.336 This legislative inertia and deference was particularly
pronounced from 2001 through 2006, when both houses of
Congress and the presidency were controlled by Republicans.337
Reform and oversight efforts began to increase when
Democrats gained control of Congress in 2006 and initiated
investigations and attempted to pass meaningful oversight
measures.338 However, the Democratically-controlled Congress
continued to defer to the Bush administration on most national
security matters. For example, in July 2008 Congress passed
amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act which
stripped jurisdiction over allegations of illegal wiretapping
from Article III courts, extended executive branch authority to
conduct
warrantless
surveillance,
and
immunized
telecommunications companies from liability regarding their

336

See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture
Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. LAW & POL’Y 455, 464-66 (2005); Peter Margulies, True
Believers at Law: National Security Agendas, the Regulation of Lawyers, and the
Separation of Powers, 68 MD. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2005); Sudha Setty, The President’s
Question Time: Power, Information and the Executive Credibility Gap, 17 CORNELL J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 247, 256-260 (2008).
337
See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2371 n.264 (2006) (“[C]oncluding that congressional
committees exercised over 26% more oversight in times of divided government than
unified government between 1961 and 1977.” (citing JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A
WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 59-75 (1990))).
338
See Setty, supra note 336, at 260-62.
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assistance to the government in conducting warrantless
wiretapping of U.S. citizens.339
The question for Congress in 2009 is how much
oversight it is willing to exert over a Democratic President,
particularly as President Obama has recently issued stricter
internal guidelines for the Department of Justice to use in
determining whether to invoke the state secrets privilege.340
Historically, congressional oversight of the executive branch
falls by the wayside when Congress and the presidency are run
by members of the same political party. Efforts to reform and
clarify the state secrets privilege are a rare and clear example
of legislative initiative to promote genuine oversight and curb
executive branch overreaching; reform efforts should not be
derailed by unsupported claims that national security
programs would be compromised if the reforms to the privilege
were enacted, nor by a lack of will to create uniform state
secrets standards when Congress and the President are
politically aligned. Congress should consider the long-term
effects of not reforming the privilege and act to restore the rule
of law and appropriate balance of power among the branches of
government.
Second, although public outcry regarding the
administration of national security programs has been muted
at times, the cases which serve as the impetus for the proposed
2008 reforms are specific, public, and graphic—El-Masri’s case
of mistaken identity resulted in a horrific experience of alleged
abduction and torture, which was reported widely in great
detail.341
Third, whereas various oversight measures attempted
by Congress have been met with constitutional avoidance by
the executive branch (where it has refused to enforce portions
of legislation as written),342 reform of the state secrets privilege
would avoid the same fate, since the power to apply the reforms
would fall to the courts instead of the executive branch. If the
government fails to comply with a court’s request to provide
documents for in camera review, the government could be held
339

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, 50
U.S.C. §§ 1881-1885 (2008); see also Paul Kane, House Passes Spy Bill; Senate Expected
to Follow, WASH. POST, June 21, 2008, at A18 (detailing the legislation approved by the
House); Editorial, Spying on Americans, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2007 (condemning the
legislation for its expansive grant of power to the President).
340
See Holder Memorandum, supra note 7.
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in contempt or a court could decide to enter a default judgment
in favor of the plaintiffs, as the lower court in Reynolds did.
CONCLUSION
Invocations of the state secrets privilege have occurred
in every administration since Reynolds was decided and, given
the current national security landscape, litigation which
involves sensitive government information is likely to continue
for the foreseeable future.
The extensive and expansive use of the state secrets
privilege by the Bush administration illustrates the need for
process changes to be implemented in order to deal with the
most extraordinary situations, when national security concerns
are heightened and the temptation to abuse power and
maximize secrecy is at its highest. The Bush administration set
a precedent that allows President Obama and any future
president to continue on a path of exerting a tremendous
amount of political power with very little oversight.343
The February 2009 decision of the Obama
administration to embrace the Bush administration’s
expansive view of the state secrets privilege underscores the
need for reform as a part of a long term commitment to the rule
of law even in the national security arena. The administration’s
pressure on the British government reflects the transnational
impact of U.S. policies: the broad U.S. interpretation of the
privilege almost trumped the domestic analysis of the privilege
by U.K. courts. The long-term effects of such pressure are yet
to be seen, but the decisions in the Mohamed case reflect the
possibility that the U.S. application of the privilege could be
exported more widely under threat to other countries of
national security repercussions from the United States.
The Obama administration’s new policy to determine
whether to invoke the state secrets privilege is demonstrably
better than the previous policy: the new structure mandates
layers of review within the Justice Department, including an
initial determination by a Justice Department official, a
recommendation by a newly established State Secrets Review
343

Nat Hentoff, Consider the Constitutions of Obama and McCain as You
Choose Sides, VILLAGE VOICE, June 17, 2008, at 14 (“Unless explicitly repudiated by
the next president and prohibited by law, the precedents of the Bush presidency will
stand. The expanded powers of one president typically are carefully guarded by their
successors . . . Republican or Democrat.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Prof. David Orr, Oberlin College)).
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Committee, and approval of the Attorney General before
invoking the state secrets privilege in court.344 As promising as
this new policy seems, congressional reform is still needed to
ensure an external, long-term check on executive branch
overreaching that would exist independent of what internal
policy is adopted by an administration. Passage of a strong
state secrets reform measure can ensure a fair standard in the
courts and an opportunity for redress for those alleging grave
violations of civil rights and civil liberties.
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See Holder Memorandum, supra note 7, at 2-3.

